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The objective of this study was to determine the perceptions of the impact of 
political instability on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria. 
In conducting this research, 350 questionnaires were distributed to some selected 
Foreign Direct Investors, Nigerians, and chief executive officers (CEOs) of indigenous 
companies. Out of the 350, 280 questionnaires were completed, returned and analyzed 
for this research. Chi-square statistics and frequency distribution were used for the 
evaluation of the perceptions of the impact of political instability on foreign direct 
investment in Nigeria. Two hypotheses were also developed on the same subject. 
The results of the tests conducted showed that fo reign investment is negatively 
affected by political instability in N igeria. The results of the study suggest that it w ould 
be good public policy for the Nigerian Government to strike a balance between the 
nation's developmental objectives and the interest o f foreign investors. 
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The Federal Republic of Nigeria, which became a sovereign nation in October 
1960, is politically, economically and population wise, one of the greatest countries in the 
continent of Africa.' In fact, its importa nce in Africa gives it automatic recognition as one 
of the countries with the greatest political and economic potential in the "Third World." 
Nigeria, with its capital in Abuja, is divided into states which are governed by the 
state governors or administrators. Nigeria also has at least 250 distinct ethnic groups, the 
principal ones being: Hausa, Ibo, and Yoruba. Figure 1 depic ts a map of Nigeria and a 
location of its states. 
Nigeria is a tropical country. The climatic condition along the coastal areas in the 
south is more stable than the rest o f the country. There are two main seasons in the year, 
the wet season and the dry s eason. 
Over the last two decades, industrial growth has become a crucial factor in the 
pace and pattern of Nigeria's economic development. Foreign trade has expanded 
consistently and trade with the western world has increased considerably. 
'R . Olufemi Ekundara. An Economic History of Nigeria (New York: African 
Publishing Company, 1973), 3. 
1 
2 
Fig. 1. Map of Nigeria 
SOURCE: Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria Since J985: A Political 
and Economic Outline (New York: African Publishing Company, 1996), 
xiv. 
Fig. 1. Map of Nigeria 
SOURCE: Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria Since 1985: A Political 
and Economic Outline (New York: African Publishing Company, 1996), 
xiv. 
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According to Adamu Ciroma, Nigeria, with a current population estimated to be 
nearing 100 million, is by far the largest single market within a political unit in the 
continent of Africa." Nigerian market potential is further enhanced by its membership in 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)3 since 1975. 
Previously, agriculture was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy because of the 
vast acres of land and the good climate with which it is endowed. However, the country 
is sustained by its crude oil, with noticeable growth in the manufacturing, commerce and 
construction of industrial bases. 
Nonetheless, Nigeria still remains an importer of food. Ciroma maintained that 
the present objective of the Government of Nigeria, as stated in the fourth development 
plan (1981-1985) and in the previous three plans, is to make the economy not only self-
reliant, but also to export consumer and capital goods within the shortest possible time 
with its recently acquired wealth,4 from the sale of crude oil. 
In spite of all these potentials and resources, Nigeria is beset by frequent political 
changes. The Federal Republic of Nigeria has undergone a number of political changes 
in the past couple of decades. 
The first political change was the British political interference in 1951, when the 
British Military acted against Lagos in an e ffort to force the King of Lagos (Kosoko) to 
abandon the slave trade.5 Since that time, there has been political upheaval. 
2 Adamu Ciroma, "Opportunities for Potential Investors in Nigeria," Nigeria Trade 
Journal (April 1981): 43. 
3Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is an economic 
grouping of 16 West African Countries Founded in 1975 to facilitate trade and prom ote 
joint development efforts among the member States. 
4Ciroma, 43. 
"J. J. A. Ajayi, The British Occupation of Lagos, 1951-1961 (Lagos, Nigeria: 
Ayo Publishing Co., 1988), 96-105. 
4 
During the ' 60s and '70s, the central feature of the national policy for industrial 
development was the tactic of import substitution. Apparently, this strategy was designed 
to help the country reduce its dependency on finished imported goods. 
This policy created investment opportunities in industries such as textiles, food 
and beverages, beer and soft drinks, livestock feeds, car assembly plants, footwear, 
tobacco, ceramics, wood products, batteries, enamelware, carpets, cements, soap and 
detergents, tires, metal goods, dairy products, and household furniture.6 This policy, 
however, while appearing to be achieving its objective, tremendously increased the 
country's import bills for the supply of machinery, equipment and spare parts. It also led 
to an over-dependence on imported raw materials because of exclusive reliance on 
imported inputs for the l ocal operations. 
In the recent years, the government has presented significant industrial policy 
objectives that led to decreasing dependence on imported inputs. The strategies for 
achieving this policy objective include the following: 
i. Divestment of Government holdings in certain industrial enterprises and 
concentration of government effort on supportive and catalytic functions 
through the provision of infrastructure facilities that would stimulate private 
sector investments; 
ii. Self reliance through maximizing local value added; 
iii. Local raw material development and utilization; 
iv. Promotion of export-oriented industries; 
v. Acquisition of industrial technological know-how; 
vi. Development and utilization of domestic technology; 
vii. Research and development; 
6Ibid„ 3. 
5 
viii. Employment generation; 
ix. Industrial dispersal; 
x. Development of small and medium size industries, and the 
xi. Liberalization of control in order to facilitate greater indigenous and foreign 
investments. 
Therefore, the objective of this study was to investigate the following: 
(1) The Perceptions of the Impact of Political Instability on Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) in Nigeria and 
(2) The relationship between the political changes and the perceived policy 
intervention between 1980 and 1993. 
The Background of the Problem 
The growing importance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria, which the 
government attaches to its economic development programs, has generated some interest 
among multinational corporations (MNCs). Specifically, factors which prompt MNCs to 
increase or decrease FDI in individual countries have intrigued and evaded researchers for 
many years. The findings of survey-based studies, according to K. Fatehi-Sedeh and 
M.H. Safizadeh, indicated that MNCs consider the socio-political stability of their host 
country as one of the most important considerations in allocating funds to foreign 
projects. That concern is due to the belief that the absence of socio-political stability in a 
country is likely to subject foreign investments to the vagaries of forces beyond the 
investor's control.7 
Kamal Fatehi-Sedeh and M.H. Safizadeh, "The Association Between Political 
Instability and Flow of Foreign Direct Investment," Management International Review 
29(1989): 4. 
6 
In Fatehi-Sedeh and Safizadeh's investigation, they added that polit ical instability 
is not the only factor that can impair the interest of MNCs. They also suggest that there is 
an increase in the perceived level of political risk of investing in a country when 
symptoms of social political instability such as riots, demonstrations, strikes, 
assassinations, and the like emerge. Today, Nigeria cannot be described as a politically 
stable country. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1960 and becoming a Federal 
Republic within the commonwealth of nations in October 1963, Nigeria has never been 
politically stable. 
Among the problems of this political disturbance are the awesome diversity in 
culture, religion, ethnicity, and language background. Other problems advanced by 
Eguaroji range from lack of patriotism and national identity, to poor constitutional 
arrangements. He further adds that ethnicity and corruption may have contributed to the 
collapse of the first and second republics, "but this does not suggest Nigeria's rejection of 
a democratic system of government but instead a clear rejection of those in government 
whose ineptitude, incompetence and bad faith pushed them to flaunt the rules of 
democratic governance."1* 
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has been regarded as an unstable country 
with a number of documented military coups and counter-coups. There has also been a 
number of intertribal civil wars and what may be described as country political unrest. 
Since the 1960s, Nigeria has been able to hold two brief civilian governments. It started 
with a parliamentary system in October 1960 which failed in 1966. Differences between 
the North and South resulted in a 3-year civil war between the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria and the defunct Biafra (1966-1970). The second government, which began in 
8Francis Eguaroji, "An Association of the Impact of the Political Change and Art 
Leadership Orientation On Arts Policy Implementation in Nigeria." (Ph.D. dissertation. 
The Ohio State University, 1988), 8. 
7 
1979, was designed to take after the American Presidential System. This second civilian 
government, under the leadership of former President Shehu Shagari, lasted for only four 
years and was also toppled in December 1983. Finally, the last attempt, which tried to 
reintroduce the democratic system, was aborted in June 1993, followed by the seizure of 
power again in November 1993 by General Sani Abacha from the interim civilian 
government. 
So far, what has been established is that Nigeria has undergone a series of 
political changes. These changes have been followed by similar changes in Fiscal 
policies. For example, during the 1994 budget speech given on January 11, 1994, the 
Head of State, General Sani Abacha, announced that the Nigerian Government would 
actively monitor the decision to peg the Foreign Exchange rate (value) of the Naira (N) 
from N 40 : $1, to N 22 : $1.'° 
Three months later, the Federal Government fixed the Foreign Exchange rate of 
the Naira at N 22 : $1, to strengthen the value of the beleaguered national currency; the 
Foreign Exchange rate has now increased to N 50 : S1. This, therefore, means that the 
fluctuation in foreign exchange will negatively affect foreign investors because the 
perceived risk is high." 
O 
Naira is the unit of Nigerian currency. 
10Sani Abacha, "Budget Speech" Daily Sketch, January 11, 1994, 1. 
"ibid., 3. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Some economists have questioned the wisdom of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in underdeveloped economies.i: The proponents of FDI have made claims 
concerning the viability of foreign private investment in the economic development of the 
Third World.13 
In West Africa, however, the studies that were conducted on this subject arc 
insufficient. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, "Although 22 percent (22%) of 
all foreign investments in Black Africa are in Nigeria, very few studies have been 
undertaken to measure the impact of foreign investors on the Nigerian economy."" 
According to Ronald Findly, international direct investment of foreign entrepreneurs 
helps to alleviate the economic woes of the Third World countries.'^ 
In developing countries, particularly in Nigeria, the problems confronting foreign 
direct investment as a result of government's policy intervention and political instability 
have long been recognized by FDI. This study focused on countries (mainly Western 
countries) that invested their capital in Nigeria between 1980 and 1993. 
The Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the perceptions of the impact of 
political instability on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria and the relationships 
12 Stephen A. Resnick, "State of Development Economics," American Economic 
Review (May 1975): 321-322. 
1 Theordora H. Moran, "Multinational Cooperation and Dependency. A Dialogue 
For Depentistas and the Non-depentistas." International Organization 4 (Winter 1978): 
94. 
"Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review (June 1980): 32. 
1 Ronald Findly. "Some Aspect of Technology Transfer and Direct Foreign 
Investment (FDI)," American Economic Review (New York: Norton, 1968): 561-565. 
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between the political changes and the perceived policy intervention between 1980 and 
1993. In other words, this study assessed the degree to which political instability in 
Nigeria has impacted FDI in the country. 
Policy makers and political activists alike have expressed dissatisfaction with the 
attitude of governments toward foreign investors. Speaking on the subject, the former 
Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs stated: 
Although our policy is now sixty percent participation in certain 
enterprises the government still wants, and indeed expects full 
involvement of foreign partners in these enterprises. No country can 
forever leave its economy solely in the hands of foreigners and no self-
respecting government can afford to ignore its responsibility in this 
regards. Our policy on participation is not "Right or Left," "Capitalist or 
Communist;" it is purely and simply designed to benefit Nigeria and 
friends of Nigeria. 
Research Questions 
In trying to assess the perceptions of the impact created by the political instability 
in Nigeria towards FDI, it w as appropriate to note the series of political changes which 
have successively produced new leaders who attempt to develop their new individual 
political styles. It is observed that these leaders, in an attempt to develop their individual 
political portfolios, have either upheld, eliminated and/or moderated some existing 
policies which they did not consider productive. Therefore, in this research work, the 
research questionnaire (see Appendix II, III, & IV) addressed the main questions which 
included, but were not limited to, questions such as: 
(1) What effects have the frequent political changes in Nigeria had on the 
foreign direct investment? 
'^Brigadier Joseph Garba. Speech. July 24. 1976, Ministry of External Affairs. 
Lagos. 
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(2 ) To what degree have successive governments been supportive in attracting 
foreign direct investors to Nigeria? 
(3) What strategies can be positively adopted to guarantee foreign investors ol 
political stability and a stable investment climate in Nigeria? 
(4) What is the level of morale in doing business in Nigeria when there is 
political instability? 
(5) What are some of the current Nigerian Government policies that negatively 
affect foreign investment in Nigeria? 
Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study were: 
(1) To evaluate the perceptions of the impact of political instability on Foreign 
Direct Investment in Nigeria, and 
(2) To evaluate Nigerian Government policy intervention on Foreign Direct 
Investment between 1980 and 1993. 
Theoretical Framew ork 
The theoretical framework which will assist in the better understanding of this 
study is the theory of "spatial preference" developed by Richardson. According to his 
theory, economic factors are necessary but not sufficient enough for firms to determine 
going abroad. He maintained that subjective factors should also be taken into 
consideration. In his model, these subjective factors are given in the form of a "spatial 
preference," analogously to the "time preference in the theory of consumption. The 
economic principle of "time preference" infers that the household prefers present 
consumption over future consumption and must be paid a premium to induce it to forego 
II 
a given amount of current consumption in exchange for the same amount of consumption 
in a future period of time, such premiums increasing with time.' 
Similarly, the concept of spatial preference infers that t he firm prefers operations 
in the location where it is already situated, even in the absence of risk. There is aversion 
to a new location or market which stems not only from physical distance but a lso from 
differences in language, political system, ideological and economic environment, and in 
laws and customs. To induce the firm to build a new plant in a new location, a premium 
(a higher rate of return) must be assured, to cover the firm's aversion to a new location. 
The rate of aversion is called the rate o f "spatial preference," and this increases with 
"distance," i.e., the more "distance" the new market, the greater the rate of spatial 
preference and the greater the premium (return) that must accrue to the firm to break its 
"spatial resistance." 
In summary, the firm evaluates the investment opportunities in each market from 
both economic factors which define the profitability of the investment and on subjective 
factors which reflect the management's spatial preference, before it takes off. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Two null hypotheses and two alternative hypotheses were developed to address 
this research problem. 
HYPOTHESIS 
1. H0 Some Nigerian Government economic policies discourage Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in Nigeria. 
' J. David Richardson. "On Going Abroad: The Firm Initial Foreign Investment 
Decision," Quarterly Review of Economic and Business 11 ( 1971): 7-22. 
12 
Hi Some Nigerian Government economic policies do not discourage Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in Nigeria. 
HYPOTHESIS 
2. H0 Nigerian political instability discourages Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
Nigeria. 
Hj Nigerian political instability does not discourage Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
Nigeria. 
The Importance of the Study 
This study seeks to determine the perceptions of the impact of political instability 
on FDI in Nigeria. Basic to this study is the detailed review of the strategies needed for 
attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Nigeria. 
The importance of the study lies in the fact that not much work has been done on 
the subject matter. This study will also recommend the possible strategies that Nigeria 
could adopt to attract FDI to Nigeria. 
Limitations of the Study 
Several factors constituted limitations in the course of carrying out this research 
study. 
Limitations range from the attitude of the respondents to financial inadequacy. 
(1) The major limitation of this study was financial inadequacy. The wave of 
present economic hardship affected the researcher a great deal due to the 
high cost of fuel. 
(2) Some of the respondents, mostly chief executive officers (CEOs), could not 
be reached; and some executives of foreign companies were reluctant to give 
information on the activities of their companies. 
13 
Another limitation was the unavailability of data. At the time of conductinCT 
this research, data on the stock of foreign investment in Nigeria as at 1980 
to 1993 could hardly be found. 
CHAPTER II 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY AND METHODOLOGY 
Methodology 
In order to carry out this research, the researcher adopted two broad methods: 
Personal interviews and fully designed questionnaires. Due to the nature of the research 
study, the major industrial cities in Nigeria where the foreign direct investors account for 
a greater proportion of foreign investments were selected for the research site. 
Questionnaires were designed and distributed through stratified random sampling 
of population as follows: 
(1) Foreign direct investors in Nigeria. 
(2) Chief executive officers (CEOs) of indigenous companies. 
(3) Well informed Nigerians (Nationals). 
Sources of Data Collection 
Primary and secondary sources constituted the source of information for this 
research study. The primary sources included personal interviews and structured 
questionnaires, while secondary sources included information from books, journals, 
newspapers and current affairs. 
Primary Sources 
Much of the information embodied in this research study was obtained through 
the application of questionnaires administered in Nigeria to some selected respondents 
comprising foreign direct investors, executives of some Nigerian firms, and well 
15 
informed nationals involved in the area of economic planning in Nigeria. Supplementary 
information was also obtained through chief executive officers (CEOs) ol indigenous 
companies and some oral interviews. 
Validity of the Research Instrument 
The questionnaires were designed in a multiple choice and open-ended pattern. 
This approach was adopted so that the respondent could easily respond, thereby 
enhancing the chances of a favorable return. Also, an open-ended pattern was adopted to 
avoid a biased response. The questions were designed to reflect the problem and objective 
of the study. To validate the research instruments, questionnaires designed for this study 
were given to three faculty members and forty-five graduate students (Ph.D. students) at 
Howard University African Studies Center for comments. 
The researcher had to do so to account for high quality and non-biased kind of 
responses. Out of this sample population, 80 percent maintained that the quality of the 
questionnaires was sound and reflected the objectives of the study. Comments given by 
the rest of the 20 percent of the population were also taken into consideration when the 
researcher constructed the final questionnaires for the study. 
However, the final copies of the questionnaires were reviewed and approved by 
the three faculty members selected. In this regard, consistency and coherence were 
maintained. 
Secondary Sources 
Secondary data necessary for this study were obtained from textbooks, current 
journals (journals of business, magazines and articles), articles which were obtained from 
The Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos; the Bank's Quarterly Economic and Financial 
16 
Review. Annual Report statements of various accounts were highly invaluable for the 
research study. 
The Sample 
A total of three industrial cities out of the thirty states of the federation were 
selected for this study. The cities selected include Lagos, Onitsha, and Kaduna. These 
areas were chosen due to the overwhelming concentration of foreign industrial 
establishments and their true representative potential of other cities. Companies involved 
in finance, manufacturing, and service industries were selected. To ensure an accurate 
representation of our sample, a stratified random sampling method and convenience were 
employed. 
A total of 25 companies were selected from each sub-group (finance, 
manufacturing, commercial and service), and a stratified random sampling was taken 
from each sub-group of several companies. In this regard, each selected company also 
covers the major industry group viz, investment companies, banking, computers and 
office equipment, food, beverages, tobacco, footwear, pharmaceutical/animal teeds, 
publishing, packaging machinery (marketing), textiles, petroleum, marketing and 
industrial/domestic products. This selection was done to avoid any industrial bias. 
Questionnaires were distributed according to the size of each city of the sample 
population. They were also distributed among the following; 
(1) Executives of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria. 
(2) Chief executive officers (CEOs) of indigenous companies, 
(3) Well informed nationals (Nigerian). 
The distribution pattern of the questionnaires was as follows. (See Table 1) 
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In Lagos state, out of 210 questionnaires, 90 were distributed to the executives of 
FDI in Nigeria, and 60 questionnaires were also distributed to the Chief Executive 
Officers of Indigenous Companies and well informed Nigerian (nationals) respectively. 
In Anambra State, Onitsha, out of 70 questionnaires, 30 were distributed to the 
Executives of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria, and 20 questionnaires were 
distributed to the Chief Executive Officers of indigenous companies and well informed 
Nigerians respectively. 
The same pattern was used to distribute the 70 questionnaires allocated to Kaduna 
State. That is the ratio of 3:2:2, to Executives of (FDI) in Nigeria, Chief Executives of 
indigenous companies and well informed Nigerians respectively. 
TABLE 1 
DISTRIBUTION PATTERN OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
STATE/INDUSTRIAL CITIES NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
ANAMBRA/ONITSHA 70 
LAGOS/LAGOS 210 
KADUN A/KADUN A 70 
TOTAL 350 
Out of the 350 questionnaires distributed, 285 were returned or duly collected. Of 
the 285 collected, 280 were analyzed, and 5 copies were discarded due to incorrect 
completion. Copies of questionnaires were coded as follows from the states/industrial 
cities. (See Table 2) 
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TABLE 2 
RETURN RATE OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
INDUSTRIAL 
CITIES/STATES 
NUMBER OF COPIES 
DISTRIBUTED 




ANAMBRA/ONITSHA 70 55 
LAGOS/LAGOS 210 180 
KADUNA/KADUNA 70 45 
TOTAL 350 280 
Description of Test Statistics 
The statistical tool used in testing the hypotheses of the research work is the chi-
square (X2) test. The chi-squares, denoted by the Greek letter X". is frequently used in 
testing a hypothesis concerning the difference between a set of observed frequencies of a 
sample and a corresponding set of expected frequencies. 
Chi-square is a sample statistics, which is computed as follows: 
Ie" 
Where O = observed frequency 
E = expected or theoretical frequency 
Chi-square test is usually associated with the degrees of freedom, and it is one tail test. A 
typical chi-square sketch is usually divided into two distinct regions, namely the 
acceptance region and rejection region as follows: (See Figure 1) 
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Fig. 2. Typical Chi-Square Sketch 
Where the computed Chi-square value falls into the rejection region (i.e. greater 
than the critical values), the hypothesis is accepted and the alternative rejected. 
Levels Of Significance 
The levels of significance for all the tests in the study were at 5 percent and 10 
percent respectively. 
'E. C. Osua, Introduction to Research Methodology (Onitsha: Cana-Fep 
Publishers Ltd., 1982), 72. 
CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Available literature on the subject of "political instability and foreign direct 
investment in Nigeria" seems scanty, unorganized and often contradictory. It is therefore 
the task of this chapter to carry out a scholarly review of some selected literature on this 
subject, starting with the review of literature relating to the historical perspective ol 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria. 
A Historical Perspective 
The purpose of this study was to determine the perceptions of the impact of 
political instability on Foreign FDI in Nigeria. It is obvious that since the independence ot 
Nigeria in 1960, the country has not been politically stable. This instability may have 
caused a lot of foreign owned corporations to close up completely and some to cut down 
on their sizes; however, although return on investments has been the possible reason for 
foreign investors to continue business. According to LeCraw, government policies 
toward foreign owned companies in less-developed countries have often relied on 
generalizations based upon fragmented evidence, the preconceptions of the policy­
makers, and short term political and economic pressures. It was stressed that there is 
narration in the impact of governmental role from country to country, and in the same 
country, from policy makers to policy makers. Sethi identified host-country government 
'Donald J. LeCraw, "Direct Investment By Firms From Less Developed 
Countries," Oxford Economic Review (November 1977): 4. 
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as one of the components of foreign investment company's non-market external 
. . .  2  
environment intervening in its market activities. 
Also, Buckley pointed out that in most countries, governments intervene in their 
national economies and that this intervention increases the political risk that foreign direct 
investors face.3 Other schools of thought that have explored the influence of political 
instability on FDI fall into two categories. The first one focuses on interviews with 
foreign investment decision makers. This approach employs correlation and regression 
analysis and surveying methods. The second category of this study is based on a cross-
national statistical test. Here, a discriminate analysis is utilized. It attempts to identify the 
determinant of the manufacturing FDI in Nigeria. 
In the first category, Basi concluded that political risk is a major determinant in 
foreign investment decisions. Basi's study, based on a mail survey ot more than .->00 
international executives in Nigeria, found that the nation's level of political instability and 
the extent of its market potential are the two most important factors in foreign investment 
decision-making.4 
Aharoni, in support of Basi's stand point, noted, however, that the association of 
political risk is usually based not on hard evaluation data, but rather on impressionistic 
generalizations.5 Piper, in contrast to Basi's study, concludes that with very few 
2Parkash S. Sethi, "Opportunities and Pitfalls for Multinational Corporation in a 
Changed Political Environment," Long Range Planning 20 (December 1987): 4. 
'Adrian Buckley, "Taking Account of Political Risk," Accountancy (July 1987): 
79. 
4R. S. Basi, Determinants of United States Private Direct Investment in Foreign 
Countries (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1963), 15. 
5Yair Aharoni, The Foreign Investment Decision Process (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Graduate School of Business, 1966), 5. 
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exceptions, political and social variables " tend in general, to be treated with the same 
lack of concern in the foreign context as they are in domestic."6 
The association between political stability and FDI was also reported by Agodu. 
In his investigation, which was based on a sample of 33 United States firms having 46 
manufacturing investments in 20 African nations, he demonstrated that no single factor 
alone determined the U.S. private manufacturing investment in Africa. He pointed out, 
however, that political stability is one of the many factors that depict strong correlation 
with the level of U.S. manufacturing investment in that continent.7 
In the same fashion, Cunningham and Green applied regressional analysis, using 
the data of 25 developed and less developed countries, to determine the variables that 
influence the fluctuations of the U.S. manufacturing and total foreign investment closely 
related to market potential proxied by GNP and population. Their findings depict that 
marketing potential areas are the most important determinants of all the allocations ol 
U.S. foreign investments, while political stability was found not to be significantly 
related to foreign investment. The validity of the research sampling may be questionable 
because both developed and developing countries are studied. 
In his study, Kobrin, in contrast to Green and Cunningham, supported the 
presence of a negative relationship between political instability and FDI. Kobrin used the 
data of 48 nations to see whether the number of U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries 
'j. R. Piper Jr., "How U.S. Firms Evaluate Foreign Investment Opportunities," 
MSU Business Topics 19 (Summer 1971): 16. 
7Oriy Agodo, "The Determinants of U.S. Private Manufacturing Investment in 
Africa," Journal of International Business Studies 4 (Winter 1978): 95. 
"Robert T. Green and William H. Cunningham, "The Determinants of U.S. 
Foreign Investment: An Empirical Examination,' Management International Review 15 
(1975): 113. 
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established in each country over the years 1974-1977 can be explained by two levels 
(high & low) of the severest forms of political conflict labeled conspiracy. 
The statistical results supported Kobrin's proposition that the association between 
political stability and FDI is more likely to be conspicuous when there is an economically 
rooted conflict and the government has sufficient administrative capability to indirectly 
respond to it. Levis, using regressional analysis on his studies, collected the data of 25 
developing countries. Based on his studies, he concluded that economic conditions are 
the prime determinants of the flow of foreign investment whereas political factors are the 
second order determinants.10 According to Schollhammer and Nigh, FDI is not only 
influenced by political instability (internal conflicts), but it is also the result of other 
factors such as the stability of the political system of the host country (internal coopera­
tion) and an inter-governmental relationship that could be cooperative or conflictive in 
nature and market size.1 ''12 
Schollhammer and Nigh employed a conflict and peace Data Bank in 
distinguishing between German Foreign Direct Investment (GFDI) in developed and less 
developed countries. The conflict and peace Data Bank was utilized to measure internal 
'Stephen J. Kobrin, "When Does Political Instability Result In Increased 
Investment Risk T Columbia Journal of World Business (Fall 1978): 13. 
10M. Levis, "Does Political Instability in Developing Countries Affect Foreign 
Investment Flow? An Empirical Examination." Management International Review 19 
(1979): 3-7. 
"H. Schollhammer and D. Nigh, "The Effect of Political Event on Foreign Direct 
Investment by German Multinational Corporations," Management International Review 
1 (1984): 28. 
l2Douglas Nighm, "The Effect of Political Events on United States Direct Foreign 
Investments: A Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Analysis," Journal of Business 
Studies 15 (Fall, 1985): 6. 
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political stability and inter-governmental relationship. Their findings indicated that GFDI 
in less developed countries was affected: 
(a) positively by cooperative political development between the host country and 
the German Government; 
(b) positively by market size of the host country; and 
(c) negatively by internal political conflict of the host country. 
In the second category, most of the studies based on cross-national data tried to 
test empirically the conclusions drawn from the above cited survey studies. Robock 
observed that while "discontinuities" in the political environment may occur, these may 
not be sufficient to constitute political risk.1' A coup, for instance, may increase or 
decrease risk, depending upon who is removed from and who comes into power. He 
also explained that while a high level of mass political violence makes the companies 
decrease their investment relatively fast, a low level of political unrest is not enough for 
them to increase their investment. 
This brief review shows that executives' attitudes play a major role in their 
evaluation of risk and profitability of the investment opportunities in these countries. 
Evolution of Political Unrest in Nigeria 
Brought under British control during the nineteenth century, Nigeria was 
organized as a British Colony and Protectorate in 1914. It became a self-governing 
federation in 1954 and achieved independence within the Commonwealth on October 1, 
1960. Under the guidance of its first prime minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, it 
l3S. T. Robock, Political Risk, Identification and Assessment (New York: Praeger 
1977), 60. 
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became a republic three years later, with the former governor general, Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe as president.14 
Though initially regarded as one of the most potentially viable of the new African 
States, independent Nigeria was beset by underlying tensions and political unrest 
resulting from ethnic, religious, and regional leverages. Weakened by strife and tainted 
by corruption, the federal government was overthrown on January 15, 1966, in a military 
coup that cost the lives of Prime Minister Balewa and other Northern political leaders and 
resulted in the establishment of a Supreme Military Council (SMC), headed by Major 
General Johnson T. U. Aguiyi Ironsi, from the Eastern region of Nigeria. Resentment by 
Northern (Hausa-Fulani tribes) muslems of the predominantly Igbo leadership and its 
subsequent attempt to establish a unitary state resulted, on July 29, in a second military 
coup, led by a northerner, Col. (later General) Yakubu Gowon. Events surrounding the 
first coup had already raised ethnic hostility to the boiling point. Thousands of Igbos 
who had settled in the North were massacred before and after the second coup, while 
hundreds of thousands began a mass flight back to their homeland at the urging of 
Eastern leaders.1 
Attempts at conciliation with the Eastern Region led by Lt. Colonel Odumegwu 
Ojukwu having failed, Colonel Yakubu Gowon, as head of the federal military 
government, announced on May 28, 1967, the assumption of emergency powers and the 
reorganization of Nigeria's four regions into twelve states. Intended to equalize treatment 
of various areas and ethnic groups throughout the country, the move was also designed to 
increase the influence of the Eastern Region's non-Igbo inhabitants.16 
14 A. S. Banks, Political Handbook of the World 1995-1996 (New York: CSA 




The Eastern Region responded on May 30, 1967, by declaring independence as 
the Republic of Biafra, with Ojukwu as head of state. Refusing to recognize the 
secession, the federal government initiated hostilities against Biafra on July 6. Peace 
proposals were reportedly rejected by Ojukwu on the ground that they failed to guarantee 
Biafra's future as a "sovereign and independent state."17 Biafra sustained the civil war 
longer than generally expected, despite the loss of most non-Igbo territories, high 
casualties and a growing threat of mass starvation. A series of military defeats in late 
1969 and early 1970 finally resulted in the surrender of the rebel forces on January 15, 
1970.18 
Although the war was over, normal political life remained suspended. However, 
on July 29, 1975, while Gowon was attending an Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
meeting at Kampala, Uganda, his government was overthrown in a bloodless military 
coup led by Brigadier (later General) Murtala Ramat Muhammad. Muhammad was soon 
assassinated on February 13, 1976, during an abortive military coup led by Buka Suka 
Dimka. Muhammad was succeeded by Lt. General (later General) Olusegun Obasanjo, 
19 who arrested and executed Dimka and others involved in the failed coup. 
On September 21, 1978, Nigeria's twelve-year-old state of emergency was 
terminated and the ban on political parties lifted. Elections were contested in mid-1979 by 
five political parties, and Alhaji Shehu Shagari and Alex Ekwueme of the National Party 
of Nigeria (NPN) were elected the president and vice president of Nigeria, respectively. 
But on December 31, 1983, another military coup led by Major. General Muhammadu 
Buhari toppled the civilian government of Shagari, accusing leading politicians of 





(later General) Ibrahim Babangida seized power from Buhari on August 27, 1985. There 
was, again, a counter-coup attempt late in the same year by a group of disgruntled 
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military officers, several of whom were executed in March 1986. 
Local non-party elections were held in Nigeria on December 12, 1987, only to be 
invalidated by the Babangida administration on March 26, 1988. In May 1989, 
Babangida lifted the ban on party politics and 13 parties secured recognition. However, 
on October 7, 1989, Babangida, again, dissolved all 13 parties, substituting them with a 
regime-sponsored two-party system of government—Social Democratic Party (SDP) and 
National Republican Convention (NRC). In January 1990, General Babangida canceled 
State visits to Italy and the United States in the wake of widespread unrest, provoked by a 
December 29 reshuffle of senior military and civilian officials. The political instability 
and tension culminated in a coup attempt at Lagos by mid-ranked Army officers on April 
22, which was reported to be the bloodiest in Nigerian history, with at least 30 persons 
killed in heavy fighting."1 
Meanwhile, the long delayed presidential balloting went ahead on June 12, 1993, 
with the SDP candidate, reputed billionaire Moshood Kashimawo Olawale ("MKO ) 
Abiola, the apparent winner over the NRC's Basir Othma Tofa. However, on June 16, 
the Babangida administration withheld the result of the election. The two parties 
thereupon agreed to form an interim coalition government if Babangida would authorize a 
return to civilian rule by the previously agreed upon date of August 27. The General s 
response being negative, serious rioting erupted at Lagos on July 5, followed by the 
announcement that a new election from which the earlier candidates would be excluded. 




Babangida naming Chief Ernest Shonekan head of an Interim National Government 
22 (ING) prior to resigning as president on August 26, 1993. 
On November 10, 1993, the Federal High Court unexpectedly pronounced the 
ING unconstitutional, and on November 17 Shoekan resigned in favor of a new military 
administration headed by Gen. Sani Abacha. Subsequently, Abacha formally dissolved 
the ING and banned the SDP and NRC."3 On June 22, 1994, Moshood Abiola, who, 
based on the 1993 poll, had declared himself president eleven days earlier, emerged from 
hiding to address a rally at Lagos and was arrested the following day on charges of 
treason. Subsequently, a large number of strikes erupted to protest Abiola's arrest. The 
most serious of the stoppages was by the oil unions, whose resistance crumbled in late 
August after Abacha replaced their leaders with military-appointed administrators. In the 
interim, Abiola remains in prison, Abacha remains Nigeria's military dictator and the saga 
of the evolution of political unrest in Nigeria continues!24 
Critical Evaluation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria 
the Opponents Against the Proponents 
For clarification and illumination, many antagonists of FDI in Nigeria contradict 
virtually every theoretical advantage outlined by the neo-classical economists. These 
antagonists argue critically to discredit the favorable propositions enumerated in favor of 
the foreign direct investors in the following areas: transfer of technology, supporting of 





Transfer of Technology 
Opponents of FDI in Nigeria argue that "far less technology" is transferred by 
foreign investors than they claim.25 Therefore, foreign investors maintain a monopoly 
over the transfer of technology. According to Johnson, "the investor . . . has no 
26 commercial interest in transferring her knowledge to potential native competitors." 
In response to the argument advanced by critics of FDI that foreign subsidiaries 
transfer inappropriate capital-intensive related technologies to Nigeria, proponent 
Raymond Vernon stresses that "there is a strong case to be made that detailed industrial 
information and ways of producing things are more readily transmitted by way of Foreign 
27 Investment than by any of the other channels of communication." Furthermore, other 
proponents contend that foreign enterprises contribute to the Third World development 
because they provide a variety of training programs for the latter's technical and 
managerial development." 
Spero reflects the position of the critics by stressing that: 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) often create highly developed enclaves 
which do not contribute to the development of the latter's economy. These 
enclaves use capital-intensive technology which employs few local citi­
zens; acquire supplies from abroad, not locally; use transfer prices and 
technology agreements to avoid taxes; and send earnings back home. In 
25A. A. Akinsanya, Multinational Corporations in a Changing Environment (New 
York: Praeger, 1984), 3. 
26Harry A. Johnson, "The Multinational Corporation as an Agency of Economic 
Development: Some Exploratory Observation" in Barbara Ward, Lenore Anjou and J.D. 
Runnals (eds.), The Widening Gap: Development in the 1970s (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1971), 67. 
:7Raymond Vernon, Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: An 
Analysis of National Policies (New York: United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, 1975), 30. 
28Ibid. 
30 
welfare terms the benefits of the enclaves accrue to the home country and 
to a small part of the host population allied with the corporation." 
Additionally, opponents of FDI maintain that importation of capital-intensive 
technologies help to worsen unemployment woes in third world economies. For 
instance, Sunkel estimates that the widespread use of capital-intensive methods of 
production in Latin America has increased the unemployment rate by over 25 percent." 
Although some proponents may concur with critics that foreign establishments transfer 
capital-intensive technologies developed in industrialized countries, they added that some 
third world country policies encourage such transfers. For instance, Vernon asserts that: 
Tax exemption schemes that are based on the amount of capital invested, 
provisions permitting the duty-free importation of capital goods and 
provisions that elevate the cost of local labor beyond its marginal yield all 
create environments that favor the uneconomic use of capital."1 
Opponents contend that the employment of capital intensive methods of produc­
tion in developing countries retard economic development because they reduce the growth 
of the local market and exacerbate third world balance of payment difficulties.32 
It was also alleged that: 
The capital-intensive production of multinationals creates a restricted, 
limited, and upper-class market and society, favors skilled over unskilled 
labor and allows for growing incomes for a small, and in relative terms, 
constant or contracting section of the working population ultimately giving 
rise to growth without development. Finally, the importation of inappro­
priate technologies may exacerbate the existing tendencies toward techno­
logical dependence on FDI and further enhance the firms' hegemonial 
00 
"* Akinsanya, 217. 
l0Osvado Sunkel, "National Development Policy and External Dependence" in 
Yale H. Ferguson (ed.), Latin American and Contemporary Inter-American Relations 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 484. 
31Vernon, 217. 
32Giovahni Arrighi, "International Corporations, Labor Aristocracies, and 
Economic Development in Tropical Africa" in Robert Rhodes (ed.), Imperialism and 
Under Development: A Reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 229. 
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dominance. In other words, rather than simply providing a better product 
at a lower price, FDI transmits to underdeveloped countries a profile of 
preference and desires unsuited to their economic and social needs.33 
However, according to Biersteker, many of these arguments have their intellectual 
origins in the work of Marx on the class nature of ideas. Marx contends that those who 
have the means of production at their disposal, control that means of mental production 
and, in turn, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production. 4 Proponents 
insist that foreign subsidiaries do not import capital-intensive technology into developing 
countries with harmful intention; rather, they pursue economically rational objectives.37 
Wells asserted that the transfer of capital-intensive technologies to third world 
countries "can occur when the private cost of developing a new production process is 
higher than the expected private yield, it can also occur on occasion out of sheer inertia or 
ignorance of local condition on the part of foreign- owned enterprises." 
Proponents also argue that foreign subsidiaries adapt their production method to 
local conditions, particularly in the area of cost and supply. According to Vernon, "a 
considerable amount of adaptation [of production techniques] actually does take place in 
enterprises as they move their products and processes across international boundaries into 
less developed area."37 Vemon also stated that a significant percentage of the value added 
33Thomas J. Biersteker, Distortions or Development? Contending 
Perspectives on the Multinational Corporation (Boston: MIT Press, 1978), 14. 
3Tbid. 
35Ibid., 37. 
36Louis T. Wells, Jr., "Economic Man and Engineering Man: Choice in a Low-
wage Country," Public Policy (July 1973): 337. 
"Raymond Vemon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. 
Enterprises (New York: Basic Book 1972), 182. 
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by foreign enterprises in third world countries come from local rather than foreign 
38 sources. 
The studies made by Wells and Vernon acknowledged certain aspects of the 
assertion made by critics that foreign subsidiaries employ capital-intensive production 
techniques and avoid the use of local raw materials. However, they pointed out that 
because of the persistence of host government, coupled with changing market forces, 
foreign enterprises are beginning to adapt their production method. 
Finally, Akinsanya concluded that FDI subsidiaries, especially those in 
distribution trade, have performed creditably in terms of turnover and profit. These 
include Leventis Motors, and Leventis Technical, UTC (Nig.), UAC of Nigeria and FAO 
(Nig). Also, those in the manufacturing sector, including Nigerian Breweries, Nigerian 
Bottling Co., Nigerian Tobacco Co., Lever Brothers Ltd, Vono Products, Thomas 
Whyatt (Nig.) Berger Paints, Beecham and Bata (Nig.) have not done badly at all. Not 
only have they recorded huge net profits, but they also import the raw materials used in 
their factories, and because their products are manufactured under license held by their 
parent companies, the FDI subsidiaries, invariably are vehicles through which scarce 
foreign exchange earnings are transferred from Nigeria to the home-state of such FDI 
subsidiaries Akinsanya concluded.39 
,8Ibid. 
39 Akinsanya, Economic Independence and Indigenization of Private Foreign 
Investment, 22. 
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Supporting Local Producers 
Opponents assert that foreign corporations affect indigenous producers 
negatively,40 rather than help to buttress competition in local markets and terminate 
regional monopolies. This negative affect is believed to contribute to the displacement of 
entrepreneurs in the third world countries. As an example, Schmidt reported that between 
1958 and 1967, 42 percent of U.S. foreign subsidiaries were established by buying out 
local companies.41 The proponents, though, may acquiesce in the displacement of a host 
country's indigenous producers but disagree that its ramifications are necessarily harmful 
to developing countries. They contend, for example, that "the areas of concentration of 
the foreigners and that of local businessmen aie quite distinct."42 
Opponent Pinelo, maintained that subsidiaries of foreign corporations: 
Co-opt whatever local entrepreneurial talent is available, thus transforming 
the national bourgeoisie into a "transitional technocracy" ... .The middle 
class is also affected: part is incorporated into the new economic structure 
and part is left out effectively barred from upward mobility and terrified by 
the prospect of proletarianization. The working class is simply divided. 
Those few who find employment with the American subsidiary companies 
become a privileged elite within the working class. The balance of the 
labor force is left to endure the problems of unemployment and marginal 
economic existence.43 
""William C. Thiesenhusen, "Latin America's Employment Problem," Science 
(March 1971): 868. 
"'Benicio Vlero Schmidt, "Dependency and the Foreign Direct Investment" in 
Frank Bonilla and Robert Girling (eds.), Structure of Dependency (Stamford University: 
Institute of Political Studies, 1973), 27. 
42Vernon, Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries, 20. 
4,Adalberto J. Pinelo, The Multinational Corporation as a Force in Latin 
American Politics: A Case Study of the International Petroleum Company in Peru 
(New York: Praeger, 1973), X. 
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Foreign investors are said to replace local producers by purchasing controlling 
interests in indigenous firms that were originally established as import-substitution 
ventures.44 Adherents assert, too, that the consequences of displacement hinge on how 
the replaced indigenous businesses reinvest the proceeds from their transaction.45 
Additionally, the theory stressed that the impact of displacement differs in relation to the 
industry in question, the age of the foreign company, its adaptability and particularly the 
stage of its product life cycle.46 
Finally, protagonists of FDI in developing countries conclude that the positive or 
negative effect of displacement depends on how third world economies would have fared 
in the absence of foreign investors. As Biersteker stated: 
If the local entrepreneur can use local capital, labor, and available 
technology in ways that are of greater benefit to the host country's 
economy than can a multinational subsidiary, and/or if the local business 
elite is more concerned than foreign elites with conforming to important 
national economic goals (on growth inflation, income distribution, 
government revenues, modifications of technology), their displacement 
may be harmful. But based on an examination of existing studies, there is 
no empirical basis for those assumptions.4' 
^Biersteker, Distortions or Development, 7. 
45Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay, 153. 
^Raymond Vemon, The Operations of Multinational United States Enterprises in 
Developing Countries (New York: United Nations UNCTAD TD/B 399, 1972), 22. 
47Biersteker, Distortion or Development, 33. 
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Capital Infusion 
The opponents' view on capital infusion is that "foreign enterprises perpetuate a 
negative outflow of capital from developing to developed countries."48 Opponents 
disagree with the thesis that the activities of foreign investors result in a positive infusion 
49 of foreign capital into host economies. A report released by the United Nations' 
ECOSOC concludes that: "If the earnings generated by past investment which accrue to 
the foreign affiliates are deducted from that flow (the inflow from direct investment), the 
net flow is generally negative of host countries.50 Proponents disagree with critics who 
argue that foreign establishments promote the flow of capital from third world countries 
to industrialized countries, charging that the critics fail to gauge the consequences of 
changes in domestic output.51 
They contend that the critical argument would have been more compelling if third 
world countries' domestic production "would have occurred in the absence of foreign 
investment." Therefore, they conclude that payment of profit to foreign corporations 
cannot be considered an "economic drain" on developing countries. " Opponents assert 
that the resultant deterioration in the terms of trade between third world and developed 
countries partially contributed to the former's capital flight. Furthermore, since local and 
^Theodora H. Moran, "Multinational Corporation and the Developing Countries: 
An Analytical Overview" in Theodore Moran (ed.), Foreign Direct Investment 
(Washington, D.C: Heath, 1985), 4. 
49Biersteker, Distortion or Development, 4. 
"United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Foreign Direct 
Investment in World Development (New York: United Nations, 1973), 54. 
5lBiersteker, Distortion or Development, 29. 
"Vernon, The Operations of Multinationals, 20. 
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international banks traditionally grant loans to the most credit worthy applicants, foreign 
53 
investors generally benefit more from such arrangements. 
Some opponents also maintain that by remitting excessive profits, through 
dividends, interest, and royalties payment, foreign investors contribute to a net out flow 
of capital from the third world countries.54 Others charge that foreign corporations over­
price imports as a mechanism for transferring capital from developing countries to their 
parent companies in developed countries. " 
Proponents contend that foreign enterprises substantially contribute to the 
economic development of developing countries, because they are able to secure a large 
pool of production resources such as manpower, working capital and advanced 
production methods.56 In addition, proponents assert that when foreign firms secure their 
capital from host countries' financial markets, there is always the possibility that it will 
consist of funds which would not otherwise have been used productively in the local 
economy.57 Finally, proponents of FDI in developing countries argue that the third w orld 
countries' economic development can be improved because: 
First, Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) are likely to increase the 
"productivity factor" of underdeveloped countries, whether through scale 
and conglomeration effect, capital accumulation, or upgrading of labor. 
"Biersteker, Distortions or Development, 29. 
54Ibid„ 4. 
55Ibid. 
56Stephen Hymer, "The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven 
Development" in Jagdish N. Bhagwati (ed.), Economics and World Order from the 
1970s to the 1990s (New York: Free Press, 1972), 128. 
55 Vemon, Foreign Direct Investment Enterprises in Developing Countries, 
20-21. 
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Second, this factor could in time express itself in a lower price level in the 
underdeveloped countries than would have otherwise provided. Third, 
this could mean a higher volume of export. Fourth, this level of exports 
could easily swamp other balance of payments effects.58 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
Nigerian Government Policies 
Host government (Nigeria) policies towards FDI are usually designed to control 
foreign investors and make their activities more consistent with the developmental goals 
of the country. At the same time, policy makers must be careful not to alienate foreign 
investors. For instance, in an effort to explicate its manufacturing objectives to foreign 
investors, the Nigerian government published a pamphlet in 1980 entitled Nigerian 
Industrial Policy and Strategy: Guideline to Investors. In the booklet, the government 
outlined its industrial objectives as follows: 
(1) Self-sufficiency. 
(2) Increase in local resource content of manufactured products. 
(3) Generation of employment opportunities for Nigerians. 
(4) Increase in Nigeria's technological capabilities. 
(5) Local production of industrial raw materials and 
(6) Exportation of final products.59 
These six industrial objective will be explained in detail. 
The Government often offers incentives in the form of tariff protection and concessions, 
generous depreciation allowances, and tax holidays as a way of attracting external capital. 
These incentives may make it possible for foreign establishments to earn monopoly rents 
58Ibid. 
59Federal Republic of Nigeria, Nigerian Industrial Policy and Strategy: Guideline 
to Investors (Lagos: Federal Government Press, 1980), 1. 
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on their capital. However, such rents have become a source of conflict between foreign 
investors and host governments. Furthermore, since the primary objective of a business 
entity is to maximize profit, it is not surprising that critics of foreign corporations suggest 
that the objectives of third world countries and foreign corporations are mutually 
exclusive.60 For the foreign investor, above normal profits on capital imparting a 
compensation for risk is a major incentive for investing in developing countries. Kolde 
maintained that one should not expect a harmonious relationship between the two (host 
government and foreign investors) parties.61 In Table 3, Kolde identifies the possible 
area of conflict between host countries and FDI. Host governments, therefore, try to 
extract the monopoly rents of foreign firms. However, policy makers must be careful not 
to take away the main incentive of the foreign investors. 
'"Elbert V. Bowden, Principles of Economics: Theory, Problem and Policies 
(Cincinnati, Ohio: Southwestern, 1980), 386. 




POSSIBLE AREAS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN HOST COUNTRIES 
AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
HOST GOVERNMENTS FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMPANIES 
Increase of national income 
Economic modernization 
Broadly based development and dissemination of 
industrial skills 
Avoidance of foreign takeovers of domestic firms 
Development of domestic research capability 
Stimulation of investment in backward regions 
and rural areas 
Balance of payments equilibrium 
Control over the pattern of economic development 
Maximization of public revenues 
Return on investment and in crease of corporate 
assets 
Efficient, low-cost production 
Selective hiring and training of employees 
Acquisition of indigenous capacity 
Location of research and development facilities in 
countries with best universities and other 
scientific institutions 
Location in large c ities where infrastructure and 
labor supply are most developed 
Free convertibility of currencies 
Freedom of trade and investment 
Minimization of tax burdens 
Source: Endel-Jakob Kolde, Environment of International Business (Boston: Kent, 
1982), 293. 
Host country governments may reduce the foreign exchange cost of servicing 
62 foreign capital by limiting the rate of profit of foreign establishments. Foreign firms 
may respond to such restrictions by withdrawing their capital or by finding alternative 
means of taking their excess profit from the economy. As a counter measure to such 
practices as overpricing of imports or inflation of the price of technology, some 
governments may restrict the percentage of sales or profit that i s taken as royalties and 
62J. N. Bagwati, "The Theory of Immezerizing Growth: Further Application" in 
M. B. Connly and A. K. Swobody (eds.), International Trade and Money (Toronto: 
University of Toronto, 1973), 45. 
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management fees. They may also restrict the sources and prices of certain raw materials 
63 or encourage the development of local sources. 
Self-Sufficiency 
Self-sufficiency had become a central issue that concerned most African countries. 
For instance, former Tanzanian President, Kenneth Kaunda, commented that 
"independence means self-reliance." He added that independence cannot be real if a nation 
depends upon gifts and loans from another for its development.64 
Ali Mazrui observed that developing countries were preoccupied with the constant 
struggle to catch up with the West, becoming excessively preoccupied with attempting to 
emulate western methods of production, western techniques of analysis, western 
approaches to organization, and western styles of behavior. 
To narrow the gap in per capita income, in a manner that widens the gap 
in power, is to pursue affluence at the expense of autonomy. To narrow 
the gap in the utilization of computers, while increasing western 
technological control, is to prefer gadgetry to independence. . . . 
Somehow each African society must strike a balance between the pursuit 
of modernization and the pursuit of self reliance.66 
However, the Nigerian government endeavors to develop an industrial economy 
that is capable of supporting its population with minimal reliance on foreign countries. In 
a January 1994 Federal Budget Speech, the new Head of State, General Sani Abacha, 
"J. N. Bagwati, "Distortions, and Immezerizing Growth: A Generalization 
Review of Economic Studies," Review of Economic Studies 12 (May 1968): 481. 
"Walter Rodney, How Europe Under-Developed Africa (Washington, D.C.: 
Howard University Press, 1974), 29. 
' Ali A. Mazrui, "Beyond Dependency in the Black World: Five Strategies for 
Decolonization" in Aguiban Yansanem (ed.), Decolonization and Dependency 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980), 92. 
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pointed out the need for self reliance in Nigeria and the impact of the world bank/IMF 
conditionally package in the Nigerian economy. He said: 
The government would endeavor to reach an agreement with foreign 
creditors with a view to securing more favorable terms of loan repayment 
and servicing. It is our hope that the creditors would appreciate the 
particularly delicate phase through which Nigeria is now passing and 
exercise restraint in making impossible demands that only serve to further 
worsen the tenuous economic and political situation of these times.66 
According to him, the government has adopted policy measures that would lead the 
country to self-reliance. In the Nigerian industrial policy guideline, the operational 
definition of self-reliance is that no clear cut nation is said to be completely self-reliant. 
All nations exist in an interdependent world. However, the objective of the policy 
guideline is closely linked to the need to increase the percentage of local resource content 
67 of manufactured goods. 
Increase in Local Resource Content of Manufactured Products 
It has been evidenced that in order to achieve "self reliance" at any level, there 
must be an increase in the percentage of locally available raw materials in the production 
process. At present, the Nigerian manufacturing sector is heavily dependent on supplies 
• 68 from industrial countries. Dependency on foreign sources of inputs has a number of 
obvious consequences. First, it can neither control their qualities nor quantities. Second, 
it will hamper the host country's foreign exchange. Third, the importing nation can 
neither control costs of inputs nor regular supply. Finally, it cannot integrate backwards. 
^Sani Abacha, "Budget Speech," Daily Sketch of Nigeria (January, 1994): 1-3. 
67Ibid. 
^Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Account (December, 
1986), 29. 
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In an effort to encourage high percentage increases in the production of local raw 
materials, General Abacha pointed out that importation of raw materials must be con­
trolled through the Central Bank. He stated that: 
(1) All imports are henceforth to be done on the basis of letters of credit 
supported by Import Duty Report (IDR) and Clean Report Finding (CRF) 
except for imports that cost $1,000 dollars or less. 
(2) Imports on Open Account including "bills on collection," except on specific 
approval for the manufacturing and agricultural sector, are abolished. 
(3) All importers are to complete form "M." 
(4) Finally all imports of foreign exchange into Nigeria must henceforth be 
through the Central Bank of Nigeria which shall guarantee free and 
unimpeded access to such for import of goods and services.69 
Moreover, dependency on imported raw materials for production causes a drain in 
the balance of payments. Thus, the reason for this objective is to make the effects of FDI 
widespread in order to stimulate all sectors of the economy. 
Table 4 shows that dependency may lead to a drain on a country's balance of 
payments. However, achievement of this objective could contribute to the alleviation of 
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Generation of Employment Opportunities for Nigerians 
Most countries expect Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in their territories to 
increase employment opportunities. The manufacturing sector is usually the main vein as 
the employer of labor, although critics of foreign corporations maintained that f oreign 
firms are employing capital-intensive technologies in third world economies, because 
such production methods require a competitively limited labor input. For instance, 
Sabolo reported that FDI had created only two million jobs, or 0.2 percent for a 
developing country's labor force, by the end of 1979.10 As a strategy for achieving this 
objective, the Nigerian government explains that labor-intensive technologies will be 
encouraged so that over 50 million unemployed people will be given opportunities for 
employment. Table 5 shows that the Nigerian manufacturing sector employed 322,396 
people in 1993, a statistic that Nigerian policy makers would like to improve. It wou ld 
definitely be encouraging if foreign enterprises would employ labor - intensive methods 
of production in order to generate more employment opportunities for Nigerians. 
70Y. Sabolo, "Employment and Unemployment 1960-1990," International Labor 
Review (December 1975), 47. 
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TABLE5 
NUMBER OF PERSONS EMPLOYED IN THE MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA 
INDUSTRY 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Food 57.872 46,035 52.296 40,209 
Beverages and Tobacco 32,169 24,872 16,682 19,284 
Textiles 88,757 85.604 61.583 62,270 
Leather and Leather Products 7.157 23,538 14.108 7.837 
Wood and Wood Products 53,966 34,504 24,490 31.228 
Paper and Paper Products 30,243 26,967 32,459 26,351 
Medicine and Drugs; Cosmetic and 
Toiletries 20,712 18,950 10,662 14,450 
Other Chemical Products 12,024 14,061 8,385 8,999 
Rubber and Plastic Products 44,896 39,988 14,659 15.184 
Electrical Products 9,752 12,071 10,773 8,001 
Others 96,084 122,503 83,607 88.583 
Total 453,632 449.093 329,704 322,396 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos, and Federal Office of Statistics, 1994. 
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Increase in Nigeria's Technological Capabilities 
For many years, FDIs have been looked upon as agents of development, 
especially in terms of resources transferred from developed countries to the less 
developed countries. The classical economists thought that international movement of 
capital would benefit both home and host countries because capital would flow from 
countries with low marginal productivity to countries with high marginal productivity. 
But today, this theory is being challenged on several grounds. 
Accordingly, Nigerian policy makers have called on foreign firms to assist in the 
transfer of appropriate skills and knowledge that wil l be beneficial in domestic production 
in Nigeria. Bade Onimode comments: 
The transnational corporation, which is restricted to a foreign-dominated 
enclave of the Nigerian economy and is relevant to the overall input 
endowment of the country, has led to technological distortions and 
technical discontinuities and has constituted a potent imperialist barrier 
against the emergence of a truly national technological culture. As the 
sedate foreign technology affects less than 10 percent of the national 
population and is monopolized even within that minority by large racist-
inclined expatriates, the imported technology has no real chance of being 
internalized by the masses. 
Table 6 shows that Nigeria's major exports, excluding oil, consist primarily of 
forest products and a few low-technology products. Also, Table 6 shows that Nigeria's 
imports during the same period consisted mainly of finished products (consumer and 
capital goods). 
'Bade Onimode, "Technology Gaps Between Rich and Poor Countries," 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 10 (November 1972): 213. 
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TABLE6 
NIGERIAN EXPORTS OF MAJOR COMMODITIES BY ECONOMIC SECTOR 
Quantity 
(thousands of tons unless 








158.7 166.1 139.0 208.0 258.8 198.5 2.3 2.4 2.4 
Cocoa 103.4 103.1 49.2 182.8 230.0 149.7 2.0 2.1 1.8 
Palm Kernel 26.8 30.5 57.3 8.4 7.9 12.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Rubber (natural) 27.6 32.0 29.5 16.6 20.7 34.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Timber (log and 
sawn) 
— "" -- — " -- -- — 
Groundnuts 0.9 0.5 3.0 0.2 0.2 2.0 -- — 0.0 
Mineral Products 401.0 454.8 453.8 8.840.6 10.890.6 8,273.3 87.2 97.1 97.2 
Columbite n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Petroleum'1 401.0 454.8 453.8 8,840.6 10,890.6 8.273.3 97.2 97.1 97.2 




35.9 69.8 39.1 39.4 65.4 41.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Cocoa Butter 7.2 13.2 4.6 23.6 46.4 31.9 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Cocoa Liquor 0.9 1.3 1.2 2.1 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cocoa Kernel 3.3 1 1 . 1  — 5.8 10.1 -- 6.1 6.61 
Expeller 
Palm Kernel Expeller 6.8 7.0 - 0.5 3.6 2.9 0.1 0.1 0.6 
Palm Kernel Oil 8.5 8.8 4.4 6.7 3.6 1.9 - - — 0.0 
Palm Kernel Pellets 9.2 28.4 6.1 0.7 1.1 1.7 — 0.0 6.6 
Other Exports n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total Domestic Exports -- — — 9,088.0 11,214.8 — 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Re-export n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total Exports 595.6 690.7 631.9 9,088.0 11.214 6,6116 100.0 100.0 
Source: Compiled from data supplied by Bills Office, Foreign Operations Department of 
Commerce and Industries. Data on all exports from Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company, 1994. 
'Provisional 
"Estimates 
3In millions of barrels 
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TABLE7 
NIGERIAN IMPORTS BY MAJOR GROUP (N Millions) 
19911 19922 19932 
Percentage Change Between 
dl and (2) (2) and 131 
Sections (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0 Foods and Live Animals 1,052.1 686.1 534.4 -34.8 -22.1 
1 Beverages and Tobacco 7.0 6.3 13.0 -10.0 + 106.3 
2 Crude Materials 143.0 185.0 159.0 +28.9 -14.1 
3 Mineral Fuels 111.3 160.1 35.6 +43.8 -77.8 
4 Animal and Vegetable Oils 
and Fats 
84.9 79.8 199.1 -6.0 + 149.5 
5 Chemicals 852.3 1.453.7 720.7 +70.6 -50.4 
6 Manufactured Goods 1,241.7 1,670.4 1.053.6 +34.5 -36.9 
7 Machinery and Transport 3,256.6 3,444.5 2,518.9 +5.8 -26.9 
8 Miscellaneous Manufactured 
Articles 
418.3 234.4 234.3 -44.0 -0.04 
9 Miscellaneous Transactions 
Unclassified 
10.6 12.6 1.2 + 18.9 -90.5 
TOTAL 7.178.3 7,932.9 5,469.7 + 10.5 -31.1 
Source: Compiled from data supplied by Exchange Control Department and Federal 
Office of Statistics. 1994. 
'Provisional 
2CBN estimates 
Production of Industrial Raw Materials Locally 
Nigeria has a lot of mineral resources that can be converted into raw materials for 
production purposes. The cost of importation of raw materials abroad will obviously add 
to the cost of production. Therefore, the Nigerian Government has called upon the 
manufacturing sector (both foreign and indigenous enterprises) to "integrate backward" 
by producing most of their industrial raw materials locally. In an attempt to monitor the 
importation of raw materials and other facilities, the Nigeria Head of State had cut down 
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on the outflow of foreign currency and abolished some old laws that allowed business to 
freely use foreign exchange in and out of the country. For example, General Abacha said 
in his 1994 Budget Speech: 
Government has decided that all foreign exchange earned by both private 
and public sector exporters of goods and services would henceforth be 
brought into the national foreign exchange account. For the avoidance of 
doubt, the concession formerly granted to private exporters and parastatals 
to keep their foreign exchange earnings outside the Central Bank is hereby 
abolished.72 
The call for backward integration has a lot of advantages to the host countries. 
Importantly, it will: 
(1) Preserve foreign exchange. 
(2) Improve and secure quality control over parts and components. 
(3) Assure supply, or more regular supply, of materials and components from 
sources which otherwise might be controlled by powerful firms in 
monopolistic or oligopolistic markets. 
Export of Final Product 
The main objective of this is to enable and also encourage the Nigerian industries 
to manufacture high-quality products that can compete effectively in the international 
market. Exporting quality and standardized products would help to augment Nigeria's 
foreign exchange reserve and buttress its balance of payments. 
Summary 
From the above points discussed, it is obvious to say that the Nigerian 
Government has reviewed the evils and benefits that foreign investors bring to developing 
countries. The Nigerian Government (as we can see from General Abacha's speech) is 
72Abacha, 7. 
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prepared to adopt policy measures to guard against some of the developmental woes 
identified by critics of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
Nigerian Government Intervention 
Businesses in which Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) are involved attract 
government attention and intervention for several reasons. According to Prahalad and 
Doz, all multinational corporations, irrespective of the nature of business in which they 
are involved, attract host-government attention in some developing countries.71 
Doz's statement was supported by Akinsanya, who commented that many leaders 
of developing countries are concerned not only about the economic power FDIs seem to 
exercise over the lives of people and government, but are al so much concerned about the 
political consequences of the operation of these business entities. 4 He also noted that 
many FDIs are both more powerful and wealthier than their host countries and that they 
tend to create dislike, fear and uneasiness among officials of the host countries. Das 
pointed out that the regulations have become the most important factor, influencing FDI 
strategy, for survival and growth.75 McOliver noted that U.S. based companies are 
criticized more than FDIs based in other countries and that the U.S. based companies are 
"C.K. Prahalad and Y ves L. Doz, "An Approach to Strategic Control in MNCS," 
Sloan Management Review (Summer 1981): 5. 
7JAdoeye A. Akinsanya, Host Government's Responses to Foreign Economic 
Control: The Experience of Selected African Countries," International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 30 (October 1981): 769. 
"Ranjan Das, "Impact of Host Government Regulation on MNC Operation: 
Learning from Third World Countries," Columbia Journal of World Business 12 (Spring 
1981): 85. 
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a source of greater concern than companies of different parentage.76 FDIs from different 
countries may follow different strategies in their operations in the host countries. As 
shown by Wells, FDIs based in different home countries have significantly different 
characteristics in size, capital, research and development imports, and exports, 
advertising intensities, and product quality.7' 
Internalization, according to Poynter, occurs when local companies, 
entrepreneurs, or government officials feel that they have adequate resources to operate 
78 part or all of the activities of the subsidiaries without help from FDIs. However, 
Bergsten maintained that host governments use various policies to increase the probability 
that subsidiaries will respond positively to the national policies of the host country rather 
than to the global strategy of the company.79 
Managers in FDIs are concerned and frustrated by governments that force 
unwanted change in the way they want the companies' operations managed. Doz and 
Prahalad commenting on how they viewed governments intervention, noted that since the 
80 early 1970s, host governments have intervened more and more in the affairs of FDI. 
According to Poynter, FDIs are known to respond to host-government intervention by 
76Franklin O. McOliver, "The Multinational Corporation: A Conceptual 
Framework of Conflict-Analysis," Nigeria Business Review (January-March 1986): 19. 
77L. Wells, Third World Multinational: The Rise of Foreign Investment from 
Developing Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), 10. 
'"Thomas A. Poynter, "Managing Government Intervention: A Strategy for 
Defending the Subsidiary," Columbia Journal of World Business (Winter 1986): 55. 
79Fred C. Bergsten, "Coming Investment War," Foreign Affairs 53 (1974): 142. 
MIYves L. D oz and C. K. Prahalad. "How Multinational Corporations Cope with 
Host Government Intervention," Harvard Business Review (March-April 1980), 149. 
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trying to negotiate changes in either intervention law or their implication by trying to 
bypass the law or by reducing their exposure in the countries that frequently intervene in 
their affairs.81 
Investors in general, and U.S. corporations in particular, tend to blame 
government intervention in economic affairs for the majority of their woes.8" According 
to Baliga, U.S. investors blame host governments for intervening unnecessarily in t heir 
operations and making incessant and unreasonable demands. Such statements, Baliga 
pointed out, really signal an inability on the part o f both headquarters and subsidiary 
executives of U.S. FDIs to develop political strategies and maintain effective external 
relations. Franko indicated that one of the primary causes for hostility to U.S. FDIs in a 
number of host countries is the lack of discretion in dealing with FDI executives.84 
Doz and Prahalad pointed out that the efforts of host governments in recent years 
to maintain control over their own national economies have increasingly restricted the 
freedom of multinational corporation managers in developing economic resources.85 A 
government plays four different roles when it intervenes directly or indirectly in the 
economic system in order to foster and control the nation's economic development: 
8lPoynter, "Managing Government Intervention," 55. 
82"Reindustrialization of America," Business Week, June 30, 1980, 68. 
"B.R. Baliga, "U.S. Multinational Corporations: A Lesson in the Failure of 
Success" in Walter H. Goldberg and Anant R. Negandi (ed.), Government and 
Multinationals: The Policy of Control Versus Antinomy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Oelgeschlager; Gunn & Hain, Publisher, Inc., 1983), 27. 
84L.G. Franko, The European Multinationals: A Renewed Challenge to American 
and British Big Business (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 35. 
85Doz and Prahalad, 149. 
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(1) It acts as a pioneer or as an innovator 
(2) It acts as a guardian 
(3) It acts as a supplemental agent to the system and 
86 (4) It acts as a corrector of the economic system. 
Dymsza concluded by saying that "even though the atmosphere has become 
somewhat less confrontational, foreign direct investments perceive generally that 
developing governments impose a greater degree of regulation on their manufacturing 
87 investment than they did a decade ago." 
Types and Level of Host Government 
Intervention in Foreign Investment 
Kim studied 163 U.S.-based Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) subsidiaries 
operating in India, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Taiwan for the period from 
. • 88 mid-1980 to mid-1993. Data collected were on the level of host government 
intervention experienced, level of industry-competition faced, degree of FDI political 
responsiveness toward host nation, and degree of FDI corporate economic advantage. 
From his findings, the study depicted that a firm's strong economic advantage decreases 
the likelihood of intervention at all stages of industry competition. The results also 
showed that with political responsiveness held constant, all competitive stages reveal 
different intervention levels given different levels of corporate economic advantage. It 
" Jean Boddewyn and Ethiene F. Cracco, "The Political Game in World 
Business," Columbia Journal of World Business (Jan - Feb 1972): 45. 
"William A. Dymsza, "Trends in Multinational Business and Global 
Environments: A Perspective," Journal of International Business Studies (Winter 1984): 
88Chan W. Kim, "Corporation and Management of Host Government 
Intervention," Sloan Management Review (Spring 1987): 33. 
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was revealed that with economic advantage held constant during mild competition, 
intervention levels do not vary significantly for different levels of political respon­
siveness. Behrman listed the following as included in regulations imposed by host 
Governments:89 
(1) Control on entity. 
(2) Those relating to behavior once an affiliate is admitted 
(3) Those directed at reducing the control of the parent company 
(4) Those aimed at preventing interference by the parent government. 
Poynter examined the characteristics and policies of 104 FDIs operating in four 
developing countries: Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Nigeria.90 The corporate 
characteristics and policies were examined in the light of government intervention 
experienced between mid-1970 and mid-1975. The research result showed that the 104 
subsidiaries studied experienced host Government intervention ranging from 
expropriation, through various forms of foreign exchange harassments to "requests" for 
political contributions. It was reported that the more frequent forms of intervention had to 
do with the withholding of foreign exchange (affecting imports, repatriated profits, 
royalties), product prices, employment practices (wage rate, proportion of foreign 
employees and so on). According to the research results, 60 percent of the subsidiaries 
studied maintained that these forms of interventions were the major types. 
It was also pointed out that two important facts were deduced from the research 
results. These are (1) that within each nation, the government discriminates and 
intervenes in some firms more than it does in others, and (2) that within the broad 
'Jack N. Behrman, National Interests and the Foreign Direct Investment 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), 22. 
90Poynter, 9. 
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business sectors, in the same nation, the government still discriminates. The research 
results further indicate that in each of the four host nations some subsidiaries had not 
experienced any government intervention during the same time The results indicate that 
within the same nations, a majority of foreign-owned firms faced some form of 
intervention, making a significant change in their operation. 
Other forms of interventions reported in decreasing order involved general civil 
service, harassment, ownership, control of FDI product flows, and the nature of service 
provided by the subsidiaries (that is, a government enforced change from, say, being an 
importer to being a manufacturer). Jason suggested that unless Nigeria's political system 
91 regained its stability, the country will remain locked in economic throes. 
Multinational Business No.3 reported that government intervention in FDI 
operation has grown in the last ten years.92 Foreign exchange rules, fixed level for local 
control or employment, even expropriation were cited as being among regulations 
imposed by host governments on FDI. 
In two separate studies examining the types and causes of conflicts FDIs 
encounter with host-country governments, Negandhi and Baliga found that Foreign 
93 Direct Investment experienced conflicts with host governments over three main issues: 
(1) Equity participation by host nationals, 
(2) The Host Government's desire to place the control of foreign enterprises in 
the hands of local entities, and, 
"Jason Pini, "Nigeria's Economy Falls Victim to the Political Crises," African 
Business, Oct. 1993, 10. 
"Anant R. Negandhi and Rajara M.B. Baliga, Quest for Survival and Growth 
(New York: Praeger Publisher, 1979), 23. 
"Tbid. 
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(3) Transfer-pricing problems. 
In the study of United States FDIs operating in eight different countries, Fatemi, 
Pohlman and Santiaga reported that 93 percent of the respondents indicated that they 
experienced restrictions on repatriation of profit, currency regulation, and import control, 
tariffs or quotas.94 In another comparable study of 91 large U.S. manufacturing 
companies with substantial overseas activities, Root reported that out of eight restraints, 
restrictions on imports of raw materials was rated as the most frequently encountered 
government restraint.95 This, according to the report, was followed by the requirement 
for local ownership participation, restrictions on profits and capital repatriation, and 
restrictions on foreign personnel. In another study, Boodewyn and Cracco identified 
market protection, fiscal incentives, and aid and guaranties for the establishment of local 
production as three types of government intervention that are becoming a major factor in 
developing countries.96 As Poynter observed, the form of government intervention in the 
97 international scene has been changing since the mid 1960s. He noted that many nations 
have been avoiding such extreme actions like expropriation in favor of other less extreme 
methods designed to change the behavior of international firms. He also pointed out that 
intervention activities by host governments of less developed countries (LDCs) seem to 
94Al. M. Falemi, Randolph A. Pohlman and Emmanuel S. Santiago, "Influences 
of Social and Political Factors on U.S. Multinational Firms," Business Journal (Fall 
1987): 8. 
95Franklin R. Root, "Foreign Government Constraints on U.S. Businesses 
Abroad," Temple University Economic and Business Bulletin 20 (September 1967): 35. 
96Boddewyn and Cracco, 45. 
97Poynter, 10. 
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be directed increasingly toward the partial transfer of ownership and control, greater 
domestic value added, and employing and promoting more host nationals. 
Changes Made by Foreign Direct Investors as 
a Result of Host Government Interventions 
According to Das, some FDIs have had to dissolve their operations in certain 
industries and in some cases, begin operations in areas where they have no expertise to 
satisfy government requirements.98 As Root observed, five companies out of ten that had 
experienced expropriation, responded to the question as to whether they made any 
changes in their policies and operations in other countries as a result of the expropriation 
experienced.99 They responded in a personal interview with executives that they made the 
following changes: 
(1) Changing in the degree of caution in investment policy; 
(2) Sought more control over subsidiaries, and trying to set up wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, and, 
(3) Kept copies of all foreign records because they might lose them in the host 
country. 
Poynter also pointed out that a government's intervention behavior is designed to 
stimulate changes in corporate policies and characteristics.100 After studying 104 
subsidiaries in four developing countries, he reported that s ome companies enjoyed a 
relationship with the government which did not require any change in their operation. 




Furthermore, it was reported that some foreign-owned companies had to make significant 
changes in their operations as a result of government intervention. 
Nigerian Government Expropriation and Confiscation 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Nigeria argued that a state has an unlimited right to expropriate foreign-owned 
enterprises or assets located within its territory and that "there is in international law no 
rules universally accepted in theory nor carried in practice which makes obligatory the 
payment of immediate compensation or even of deferred compensation for expropriation 
of a general and personal character."101 
Bradley studied incidents of expropriation of U.S. companies that occurred in the 
Third World of non-communist countries between 1960 and 1976, using data from the 
Harvard Business School's ongoing FDI study and figures released by the U.S. 
l(p Department of State. ~ T he study indicated that the threat of expropriation appeared to be 
more serious in the mid-1970s than at any time since the 1960 Cuban seizures. 
According to Kobrin, expropriation has more recently become selective with 
single industries and or individual foreign companies being taken over with specific 
political reasons.103 
Poynter contradicts the findings of Bradley.104 According to his view, nations 
have been avoiding one action of expropriation in favor of other less extreme methods 
""Ibid., 28. 
102David G. Bradley, "Managing Against Expropriation," Harvard Business 
Review (July - August 1977): 75. 
'"'Stephen J. Kobrin, "Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in LDCs," 
International Organization (Winter 1980): 65. 
104Poynter, 12. 
since the mid-1960s. The study results indicated that the number of expropriations in 
1975 was four times that of 1970 and fifty times that of 1961. Root alluded to the plight 
of American companies abroad by stating that: l0:> 
When an American firm invests abroad, it becomes exposed to a variety of 
risks that are associated with the actual and potential behavior of the 
government. The most severe breakdown an American firm can 
experience in its relationships with a host government is the arbitrary 
expropriation of its business properties. 
"'"•Franklin R. Root, "The Expropriation Experience of American Companies," 
Business Horizon (April 1968): 69. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) IN NIGERIA 
Foreign investors are believed to control enormous assets around the world. For 
instance, a United Nations study reveals that nearly 220-multinational corporations 
(MNCs) have affiliates in twenty or more countries. The study, which surveyed the 
world's 650 largest industrial entities, found that 54 percent (358) of these corporations 
are United States based. The major home states of the other MNCs are Japan, France, 
Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany.1 
Growth and Contribution of FDI in Nigeria 
It has always been fashionable for Western scholars to explain the search for 
colonies in Africa in terms other than economic. However, that the quest for colonies 
was economic was made clear by Jules Ferry in 1895, in the Chamber of Deputies, while 
defending French colonial policy: 
The nations of Europe desire colonies for the following three purposes: (i) 
in order that they might have access to the raw materials of the colonies; 
(ii) in order to have markets for sale of manufactured goods of the home 
country; and (iii) as a field of the investment of surplus capital.2 
For the industrialized countries of the West, FDI in the Third World is an "institutional 
necessity." Although the British colonial administration in Nigeria adopted an open door 
policy toward FDI operations, this policy had meant that United Kingdom-based 
'Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World (New York: 
Longman, 1985), 437. 
K. Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom (London: Heinemann, 1962), 3. 
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investors had a field day in Nigeria. This explains why United Africa Company, a 
subsidiary of Unilever (British MNC), controlled 40 percent of Nigeria's import-export 
trade in the 1930s and 34 percent of merchandise trade into Nigeria and 43 percent of 
Nigeria's non-mineral exports in the late 1940s. 
Foreign direct investors were offered various incentives, which include a ten-year 
tax holiday for pioneer industries, generous depreciation allowances, income tax relief, 
some market protection, exemption from import duties and the creation of a more 
competitive business environment. The Nigerian constitution also guaranteed foreign 
direct investors adequate compensation in the event of compulsory acquisition or 
arbitration in cases of disputes over the quantum of compensation. In order to guarantee 
the safety of FDIs, the Nigerian government concluded bilateral and multilateral 
agreements on the protection of capital investments: 
1. Investment Guarantee Agreement with the United States; 
2. World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States; 
3. Lome Conventions I, II and III betw een Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries and member-states of the European Common Market.4 
The agreement with the United States, for example, provides insurance coverage 
to United States' investors in Nigeria against inconvertibility. Under the Agreement, 
Nigeria recognizes the subrogation rights of the United States government to claims of its 
nationals to "right, title or interest in assets expropriated or assets rendered useless by 
reasons of expropriation.'0 
A. A. Akinsanya, Multinationals in a Changing Environment: A Study of 
Business - Government Relations in the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1994), 88. 
4 Ibid., 90. 
5 Ibid., 89. 
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Foreign Direct Investment as Source 
of Finance in Nigeria 
It is generally assumed that for the fact that many LDCs are capital-deficient, the 
very act of FDI by a MNC results directly or indirectly in a capital transfer from a capital-
rich to a capital-poor country. However, several studies on the role of MNCs as sources 
of finance have shown that MNCs operating in the LDCs not only make use of local loan 
capital and retained earnings (retained profits) to finance their operations, but also that 
banks prefer lending to MNC subsidiaries to domestic enterprises. The reasons are not 
unconnected with the credit rating and financial resources backup of the parent 
companies. Additionally, MNCs raise their financial capital from local sources either by 
permitting equity participation (by some local firms/foreign and domestic investors) or 
through public subscription.6 
Foreign direct investors operating in Nigeria have also taken advantage of the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees of 1972 and 1997, in raising local finance for 
other operations. Foreign-owned insurance companies raise both equity and loan capital 
from local sources while foreign owned banks, particularly the Union Bank of Nigeria, 
First Bank of Nigeria and the United Bank of Africa, incidentally, the leading banks in 
Nigeria in terms of turnover and profits (after tax), control more than 70 percent of total 
deposits of all commercial banks. These deposits are made available as loans and 
advances largely to foreign direct investors in Nigeria. The point is that the draining of 
local financial markets by FDI has meant that domestic enterprises cannot adequately and 
effectively finance their own operations.7 
6A. A. Akmsanya, The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third 
World (New York: Praeger, 1989), 145. 
7Ibid. 
FDI Flows Into Nigeria 
Between 1964 and 1968, the United States and the United Kingdom (representing 
80% of total FDI), received about $5.8 billion from LDCs (in investment income i.e., 
capital outflow) and paid $3.2 billion (capital inflow). This implies that while the initial 
FDI may mean capital inflow, a stream of profits interests/dividends/royalty payments, 
and repatriation abroad through several devices (some of them illegal) cannot but have 
adverse effects on the balance of payments of the host-states. 
TABLE 8 













1972 236.0 58.3 177.7 
1973 265.8 174.6 91.2 
1974 119.7 147.8 (28.1) 
1975 214.2 189.5 24.7 
1976 205.6 121.1 84.5 
1977 320.0 189.2 130.8 
UNITED STATES 
1972 17.1 67.8 (50.7) 
1973 174.3 153.5 21.3 
1974 151.1 159.0 (7.9) 
1975 253.0 17.8 235.2 
1976 39.0 198.0 (159.0) 
1977 81.9 170.9 (89.0) 
WESTERN EUROPE 
1972 150.9 44.9 106.0 
1973 97.7 43.5 43.2 
1974 172.6 128.0 44.6 
1975 191.6 61.3 130.3 
1976 195.6 132.9 62.9 
1977 213.6 127.7 85.9 
OTHERS 
(UNSPECIFIED) 
1972 28.9 13.5 15.3 
1973 46.0 14.1 31.9 
1974 637.7 24.0 39.7 
1975 98.7 13.4 85.2 
1976 80.7 22.8 57.9 
1977 101.8 31.9 69.9 
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Table 8 continued 
TOTAL 
1972 432.8 184.5 248.3 
1973 577.8 385.5 192.6 
1974 507.1 458.8 48.3 
1975 757.4 282.8 475.4 
1976 521.1 474.8 46.3 
1977 717.3 518.7 197.6 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review 17, no. 2 
(December1980) (Lagos: Central Bank of Nigeria, 1980): 5. 
Table 8 shows an analysis of FDI flow into Nigeria by country or region of origin 
between 1972 and 1977. Total inflow of FDI declined by N236.3 million from N757.4 
million in 1975 toN521.1 million in 1976, but increased a year later to N717.3 million. 
In the same period, total outflow increased from N282.8 million in 1975 to N474.8 
million andN519.7 million in 1976 and 1977, respectively. Thus, the net capital inflow 
amounted to N46.3 million in 1976 and N197.6 million in 1977 compared to N475.4 
g 
million in 1975. In essence, capital inflow has declined steadily over the years. In the 
recent years, however, net capital inflow to Nigeria from 1990 to 1994 stood at N588 
million in 1990, N712 million in 1991,44897 million in 1992, Nl,345 million in 1993, 
and Nl,959 million in 1994. No statistics were available for 1995 and 1996.° 
Investment by Source Country 
The major industrialized countries have traditionally been the source of most direct 
investment activity in Nigeria. This trend continued in 1996, as seven nations; Japan, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, United States, France and the Netherlands, 
accounted for 344 transactions of 70 percent of the total transactions, a slight decline from 
8 Ibid., 150. 
international Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (March 1997): 
470. 
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the 76 percent share these countries had in 1995. The identified aggregate value of the 
transactions by the seven countries - $23.1 billion - represented 80 percent of the total 
identified value, as compared with 78 percent in 1995. The aggregate value was 97 
percent greater than the reported value of N11.7 billion in 1995, which had been a 36 
percent drop from the 1994 reported value of $18.2 billion.' 
For the ninth consecutive year, the United States was the source country for the 
largest number of transactions. More than 31 percent, or 150 transactions, originated 
from the U.S. in 1996 with 73 identified values totaling $3.2 billion. The United 
Kingdom was second with 69 transactions and 37 identified values totaling $9.4 billion. 
Canada was third in number of transactions with 42 and 19 identified values of $3.4 
billion." 
Table 9 shows the number of completed transactions with identified values by 
country for 1996, while Table 10 shows the continuing dominance of the principal source 
countries (also the United States' largest trading partners) as sources of foreign direct 
investment in the United States. 
l0Central Bank of Nigeria, "Investment by Source Country," Financial Statistics 
(December 1996): 205. 
"ibid, 215. 
TABLE 9 
SOURCE COUNTRIES - COMPLETED CASES - 1996 
(Group = Principal Source Countries) 
COUNTRY NUMBER OF NUMBER CASES/ VALUE 
CASES VALUE KNOWN (N MILLION) 
CANADA 42 19 3698.8 
FRANCE 23 10 2484.3 
GERMANY 32 12 2133.3 
UNITED STATES 150 70 3163.6 
NETHERLANDS 16 7 1847.7 
JAPAN 12 2 375.0 
UNITED KINGDOM 69 37 9419.1 
GROUP 344 157 23121.8 
SOURCE: Central Ba nk of Nigeria. Financial Statistics 8 (Dec. 1996): 205. 
(Group - Other Europe) 
COUNTRY NUMBER OF NUMBER CASES/ VALUE 
CASES VALUE KNOWN (N MILLION) 
AUSTRIA 1 0 . 
BELGIUM 2 0 
DENMARK 3 0 • 
FINLAND 3 1 10.0 
SWITZERLAND 12 2 375.0 
GREECE 1 1 49.0 
IRELAND 2 1 0.6 
ITALY 25 3 35.9 
NORWAY 3 1 8.0 
SPAIN 5 2 149.1 
SWEDEN 3 1 163.0 
GROUP 60 12 790.6 
Table 9 continued 
(Group - OPEC Countries) 
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COUNTRY NUMBER OF NUMBER CASES/ VALUE 
CASES VALUE KNOWN (N MILLION) 
GHANA 1 1 32.0 
SAUDI ARABIA 7 6 887.7 
VENEZUELA 3 1 320.0 
GROUP 11 8 1239.7 
COUNTRY NUMBER OF NUMBER CASES/ VALUE 
CASES VALUE KNOWN ($ MILLION) 
ISRAEL 3 1 70.0 
GROUP 3 1 70.0 
(Group = Other Asia and Pacific) 
COUNTRY NUMBER OF NUMBER CASES/ VALUE 
CASES VALUE KNOWN (N MILLION) 
AUSTRALIA 31 4 550.0 
BRUNEI 1 1 203.0 
CHINA 4 2 27.4 
CHINA (TAIWAN) 7 3 959.3 
HONG KONG 4 3 100.0 
INDIA 12 2 375.0 
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF 4 1 150.0 
MALAYSIA 5 5 52.6 
NEW ZEALAND 3 1 40.2 
SINGAPORE 2 1 11.6 
THAILAND 2 1 10.0 
GROUP 75 24 2479.1 
Table 9 continued 
(Group = Other Western Hemisphere) 
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COUNTRY NUMBER OF NUMBER CASES/ VALUE 
CASES VALUE KNOWN (N MILLION) 
ARGENTINA 1 0 
BERMUDA 1 1 110.0 
BRAZIL 1 1 18.0 
MEXICO 6 5 1532.1 
PARAGUAY 1 1 10.0 
GROUP 10 8 1670.1 
(Group = All Other Countries) 
COUNTRY NUMBER OF NUMBER CASES/ VALUE 
CASES VALUE KNOWN (N MILLION) 
ROMANIA 1 1 1.0 
RUSSIA 2 0 • 
SOUTH AFRICA 1 1 21.0 
TURKEY 1 0 . 
UNIDENTIFIED 3 3 34.1 
GROUP 8 5 56.1 
491 214 28691.4 
TABLE 10 
NUMBER OF IDENTIFIED COMPLETED TRANSACTIONS 
BY PRINCIPAL SOURCE COUNTRY 1991-1996 
Source Country 1991 1992 1993 
# # # # # # 
TOTAL 912 100.0 1051 100.0 1328 100.0 
Canada 101 11.1 114 10.8 122 9.2 
France 61 6.7 45 4.3 69 5.2 
Germany 69 7.6 60 5.7 77 5.8 
United States 216 23.7 351 33.4 490 36.9 
Netherlands 44 4.8 42 4.0 39 2.9 
Japan 36 3.9 39 3.7 37 2.8 
U.K. 176 19.3 176 16.7 248 18.7 
All Others 209 22.9 222 21.4 247 18.5 
1994 1995 1996 
TOTAL 1018 100.0 725 100.0 512 100.0 
Canada 46 4.5 50 6.9 32. 6.3 
France 69 6.8 32 4.4 23 4.5 
Germany 63 6.2 50 6.9 58 11.3 
United States 460 45.2 333 45.9 195 38.1 
Netherlands 19 1.9 24 3.3 8 1.6 
Japan 27 2.6 22 3.0 20 3.9 
U.K. 117 11.5 71 9.8 52 10.2 
All Others 217 21.3 143 19.7 124 24.2 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria and the Federal Office of Statistics, 8 (July 1997). 
CHAPTER V 
THE NIGERIAN EXTERNAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Overview 
It is true that the economic well-being of a nation's citizens is ultimately the 
hallmark of a successful government policy. It is for this reason that great attention is 
paid to public policy by the governments of many countries, including Nigeria. 
The economic relations the United Kingdom left behind in Nigeria in 1960 were 
preponderantly Anglocentric. This is amply illustrated by trade statistics and foreign 
investment data. For example, in 1959 and 1960, 50.6 percent and 48.1 percent 
respectively of Nigeria's total exports went to the United Kingdom alone, while 45.4 
percent and 42.3 percent of the country's total imports from abroad came from the United 
Kingdom. With respect to FDI, the United Kingdom accounted in 1959 for 74.6 percent 
of the total FDI in Nigeria.' These statistics could be explained by the fact that Sir 
Abubakar (the then prime minister of Nigeria) was evidently determined to preserve 
Nigeria's political economy of alignment with the United Kingdom and the Western 
powers. 
The direction of Nigeria's external trade from 1960 to 1985 clearly indicates that 
while the political economy of alignment with the countries of the West has been 
maintained, the Anglocentric structure of her external trade has gradually but 
progressively been dismantled, particularly beginning in 1967. By 1973, the United 
'Federal Office of Statistics, Annual Abstracts of Statistics (March 1962), 12. 
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Kingdom had ceased to be the most important market for Nigerian exports and remained 
the leading source of Nigeria's imports only up to 1964." 
The decline in the relative importance of the United Kingdom as Nigeria's trading 
partner has been paralleled by the relative growth of the then European Economic 
Community (EEC) as Nigeria's trading partner. The EEC emerged as the largest market 
for Nigeria's exports in 1967 and as a source of her imports in 1965; The United States 
has, over the years, improved its relative position as Nigeria's trading partner, 
particularly as a market for Nigeria's crude oil between 1971 and 1981. But from 1983, 
Western Europe emerged as the largest market for Nigeria's crude oil; and for the first 
time since 1971, the U.S. in 1984 ceased to be the largest single country importer of 
Nigeria's crude oil, falling behind France and Italy.4 
Nigeria's African trade between 1973 and 1983, as a percentage of the value of 
total global trade, was very small. Two interelated explanations are usually advanced for 
this phenomenon. One is that the structural pattern of external trade, which European 
colonialism left behind in Africa, is vertically between the metropolitan powers in Europe 
and the African States, which does not encourage intra-African trade. The second is that 
the economics of African states, particularly those in West Africa closest to Nigeria, are 
not complementary.5 
The commodity structure of Nigeria's external trade reflects the production profile 
of the country's domestic economy. Agricultural commodity exports have historically 
been dominated by six major commodities, namely cocoa, groundnuts, palm-kernel, 
2R. A. Akindele, "Nigeria's External Economic Relations, 1960-1985: An 





palm-oil, rubber and cotton, but which in recent years collectively contribute less than 14 
percent to the country's foreign exchange earnings. Since 1970, crude oil has become the 
most important commodity and the backbone of the nation's economy. Not surprisingly, 
Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1971 and began to 
participate in the international p olitics of oil.6 
With respect to the commodity component of Nigeria's imports, it is apparent that 
since 1960, manufactured goods, machinery, transport equipment and industrial raw 
materials have dominated the import picture. This reflects the fact that industrialization, 
particularly manufacturing, is still largely underdeveloped in the country. The Nigerian 
government, under different administrations, has continued to take seriously the 
conclusion of a World Bank field team in its report in 1955, that without foreign 
investments, neither public nor private endeavors can achieve the rate of economic growth 
that the Nigerian people desire.7 Consequently, an important goal of Nigeria's 
international economic diplomacy has been to attract FDI into the country. 
Nigeria's foreign economic policy has also sought to attract foreign loans for the 
financing of some of the projects in the country's various national development plans. 
For instance, 50 percent of the projected capital expenditure in the 1962-68 National 
Development Plan, 19.4 percent of that in the 1970-74 plan and 8.5 percent of the total 
expenditures required for financing the public programs in the 1981-85 Fourth National 
8 • Development Plan was expected to come from abroad. Nigeria's debt service ratio has 
become rather high, especially since 1983, when it stood at 17.5 percent and rose to 25 
6Ibid„ 61. 
international Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic 
Development of Nigeria (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 28. 
8G. O. Olusanyo and R. A. Akindele, Nigeria's External Relations: The Eirst 
Twenty-Five Years (Ibadan, Nigeria: University Press, 1986), 17. 
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percent in 1983, and to 44 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings in 1985.' 
Nigeria has always honored her external debt obligations, preferring to reschedule their 
payment to their repudiation. 
The Nigerian Economy 
Any economic indicator, no matter how crude, will indicate unequivocally that 
Nigeria has been moving in the wrong direction. The problem, however, appears to have 
emanated from the external sector, judging from the statistics provided by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria. The internal sector had generated a lot of earnings, particularly from 
oil. between 1973 and 1981. Indeed, this period witnessed an inflow of N65 billion in 
revenues from oil exports. Determined to utilize the oil earnings, the Nigerian 
government invested in virtually every sector of the economy. The return from these 
investments were, however, not that attractive since a lot of the investments were 
unviable 10 
Thus, while there were substantial structural changes, there were substantial price 
distortions as well. More critical, in spite of the size of the investments, the Nigerian 
economy did not have deep enough roots to withstand the wind of change that started 
blowing from mid 1981." 
The same external sector that was responsible for the ballooning of the economy 
between 1973 and 1981 was responsible for puncturing it by mid-1981. The oil exports 
dropped from $22.4 billion in 1980 to $16.7 billion in 1981 and to $12.8 billion in 
9Ibid. 
10P. A. Okoye, Money and Banking in Nigeria (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth 
Dimension Publishers, 1988), 24. 
1 'ibid., 26. 
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1982.12 The slump in the international oil market led to balance of payment problems, 
which in turn led to crises in public finance and in the economy in general. The 
increasing reliance on this sector meant increasing role of imports in the national 
production. 
By 1980, for example, imports had reached a level equivalent to 25 percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Related to this was the declining role of agriculture in 
the economy in feeding the increasing population and in earning foreign exchange. The 
value of agricultural exports fell from more than $1.5 billion in 1973 to less than $0.31 
13 billion in 1981, while the value of food imports increased during the period. The 
continued reliance on the external sector meant the increasing vulnerability of the 
economy to external shocks. 
The substantial oil earnings helped in other ways to ensure further deviation from 
the right course. For one thing, the earnings affected the valuation of the Naira currency 
which affected the growth and development of the two major sectors of the economy — 
agriculture and manufacturing. The overvaluation of the Naira dictated, to a large extent, 
an unattractive financial return from agriculture. Again, it was more profitable to import, 
than develop or use local inputs. The generally low tariff rates assisted the trend in no 
small measure.14 
At the time of independence in 1960, agriculture accounted for well over half of 
GDP and was the main source of export earnings and public revenue, with the 
agricultural marketing boards playing a major role that has now been taken over by the 
12 M. O. Ojo, "SAP and Nigeria's E-Sub-Sector," Central Bank of Nigeria 
Economic and Financial Review 27, no. 4 (December 1981): 30. 
13A. Shonekan, "The Nigerian Economy After SAP Problems and Prospects," 
Business Times (August 18 1988): 11. 
14R. Vemon, "International Investment and International Trade in the Product 
Cycle," Quarterly Journal of Economics 80 (May 1988): 21-22. 
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Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the national oil company. The 
overwhelming importance of oil in recent years is evident from the fact that this one 
commodity accounts for over three-quarters of federal government revenue and more than 
90 percent of export earnings. Nonetheless, its share of GDP fell from a quarter in 1980 
to 12.4 percent in 1991. Agriculture is still the principal activity of the majority of 
Nigerians accounting for 39.3 percent of the GDP at factor cost in 1991.15 
The rapid increase in earning from oil production during the 1970s transformed 
public finance and allowed for considerable investment in the infrastructure, educational, 
social and industrial development. Receipts from oil exports were to prove erratic, 
playing havoc with development planning and leading, in the early 1980s, to a severe 
foreign-exchange crisis that has contributed to political and economic upheavals since 
1982. Total exports dropped from a peak of $25.7 billion in 1980 to only 6 billion in 
1986.16 
The Devaluation of the 
Naira and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Prior to the structural adjustment program in 1986, Nigeria operated the fixed 
exchange rate system. Although the system is fixed, the exchange rate fluctuates within 
certain limits. Okoye, in his Money and Banking, explains how it operates: 
The Naira like most other national currencies floats but the floating is not entirely 
free since the Central Bank provides adjustment procedures which involve some 
mechanism for the identification of the need for adjustment and appropriate action. 
To regulate the float, the Central Bank, in 1974, introduced a managed float in 
which the exchange value of the Naira was administratively determined on the 
basis of change in the value of selected group of currencies of different countries 





The country's economic difficulties have been magnified by the build-up of 
sizable trade arrears, especially between 1981 and 1983, and the bunching of principal 
repayment on median and long-term debt in the mid-to-late 1980s. However, in the early 
1980s, liquidity problems started, and there was need for external financing. It wil l be 
recalled that Nigerian citizens had an unprecedented national debate in the last quarter of 
1985 on whether or not to accept the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan with its 
• 18 severe conditions package. The government, however, rejected the loan in December 
1985. Although most Nigerians appreciated the desirability of the loan, they did not 
believe that it would be judiciously used and therefore rejected the proposal to take it. 
Such an opinion was not surprising given the financial mismanagement of the second 
republic when Nigeria accumulated huge debts. 
Matters were complicated by Nigeria's reluctance to accept an IMF loan package, 
the normal prerequisite for rescheduling by the Paris and London clubs of creditors. 
Agreements on debt rescheduling were finally reached by the end of 1986 during General 
B. Babangida's erstwhile government, however, after arrangements were made for IMF 
"enhanced surveillance" without the drawing down of an IMF loan.1' 
The debt-rescheduling operation covered the end of 1987 and has since been 
followed by a series of rescheduling agreements with both groups of creditors. 
However, the situation deteriorated again in 1991-92 as negotiations with the IMF 
reached an impasse, effectively precluding a debt-rescheduling with official creditors, and 




The Structural Adjustment Program in Nigeria 
The need to restructure the Nigerian Economy was therefore predicated upon the 
enormity of these numerous problems confronting it in the last few years. A legacy of 
many development strategies have been pursued in the past. It was in the desperate effort 
to find a solution to these problems that the government in 1986 introduced the Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP) in Nigeria. The purpose of SAP is the removal of the 
perceived distortions which for many years had prevented the economy from crossing the 
threshold to self-reliant growth and development. The main objectives of the SAP 
program were: 
1. To restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order to 
reduce dependence on oil sector and on import. 
2. To achieve fixed and balance of payment viability over the period. 
3. To lay the basis for sustainable non-inflationary growth. 
4. To lessen the dominance of unproductive investments in the public sector. 
5. Improve the sectors' efficiency, and intensify the growth potential of the 
private sector. 
The major policy in the structural adjustment package was the removal of the 
perceived overvaluation of the Naira through the establishment and operation of a foreign 
exchange bidding scheme under a second-tier foreign exchange market.20 The market 
was to operate along side the first-tier market administered by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria. The first and second-tier merged on July 2, 1987, and the second-tier has 
ceased to exist while the first-tier now operates a bidding system. This mechanism for 
~°D. Phillip, Sacrifice and Pain as Necessary Cost of Structural Adjustment in 
Structural Adjustment Program in Nigeria's Economy (Ibadan, Nigeria: University 
Press, 1989), 18. 
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obtaining a realistic exchange rate for the Naira is to be accompanied by several other 
policies. 
On the commencement of the second-tier foreign exchange market on September 
29, 1986, the official expectation was a massive devaluation of the Naira in relation to the 
major international currencies. At the beginning of the economic operation in July, 1984, 
the Naira was worth N1 $1: 3028 and on the eve of the second-tier foreign exchange 
market, it had depreciated to 62.46 percent. By the end of 1986, however, it had 
depreciated to 30.3 percent. It further depreciated to 24 percent by the end of 1987, 
18.68 percent by the end of 1988 and 13.12 percent by the end of 1989. Using 1984 as a 
base year, it means that the Naira has been devalued by about 800 percent over the 1984 
value. 1 
In early 1990, the Naira held steady at close to N7.90: $1, before falling sharply 
in anticipation of impending changes in the foreign-exchange auction system at the end of 
1990. By the end of 1990, the rate had fallen to N 9:$1 and, with allocations of foreign 
exchange to the auctions proving inadequate to meet demand, the decline accelerated in 
the first half of 1991. The Naira reached a low of N 11.9:$1 in early August of 1991 
before CBN's intervention to drain funds from the banking system prompted a partial 
recovery, ending the year at N9.86:$ 1. 
In March 1992, the Nigerian government devalued the Naira to N18:$l, 
abandoned the auctions and floated the currency; it has since held fairly steady at a close 
N18.5:$l, until 1993 when it fell again toN22.1:$l. The gap between the official and 
parallel markets was virtually closed but to widen in late 1992. Table 11 shows the 




AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE 
(N3) 
Years A. Rate Years A. Rate Years A. Rate 
1982 0.673 1986 1.755 1990 8.038 
1983 0.724 1987 4.016 1991 9.909 
1984 0.767 1988 4.537 1992 17.298 
1985 0.894 1989 7.365 1993 22.065 
Source: IMF, International finance statistics, January - October 1994, and 
February 1997 (combined). 
Direction of Trade 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) data indicated that in 1991, the U.S.A. 
was still the largest client for Nigerian oil and total exports to the U.S.A amounted to 
$5.2 billion or 41 percent of the overall total. The next largest markets for Nigerian 
exports were Spain, accounting for 12.6 percent, Germany (8.6 percent) and the 
Netherlands and France (both 5 percent), respectively. UK is the eighth-largest export 
market for Nigerian exports. Nigeria's main suppliers in 1991 were Germany, (13.8 
percent) having supplanted the UK as the most important, the UK (13.6 percent), the 
U.S.A (11.8 percent) and France (8.9 percent). Table 12 shows the principal trading 
partners on both import and export between 1989 and 1991 in millions of U.S. dollars. 
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TABLE 12 
NIGERIA'S PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS (US $ '000) 
Imports c.i.f. 1989 1990 1991 
Belgium-Luxembourg 122,006 143,671 158,858 
Brazil 106,404 175,801 177,761 
China, Pe ople's Republic 86,591 128,230 189,117 
France 271,611 394,209 437,306 
Germany 591,509 644,589 874,733 
Hong Kong 52,447 96,415 125,827 
India 45,141 67,082 84,401 
Italy 185,040 193.827 295,823 
Japan 231,902 257,434 398,362 
Korea, Republic 39,543 53,977 80,155 
Netherlands 132,990 207,208 297.263 
Spain 44,609 59.463 58,904 
Switzerland 79,522 115,829 141,315 
United Kingdom 556,106 739,417 746,175 
USA 420,123 373,963 559,733 
Total (in cl. Others) 3,419,079 4,317,921 5,399,004 
Source: IMF. International Fin ance Statistics. Januarv-October 1994 and February 
1997 (combined). 
Exports f.o.b. 1989 1990 1991 
Brazil 82,307 9,423 125,854 
Canada 16,275 117,584 151,108 
Cote d'lvoire 192,737 224,270 298,286 
France 349.424 292,856 307,135 
Germany 335,879 591,369 414,584 
Ghana 171,746 224,694 190,117 
Italy 340,367 298,146 431,857 
Netherlands 651,942 933,627 475,348 
Portugal 244,797 282,531 135.099 
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Spain 862,201 939,451 1,112,893 
United Kingdom 142,533 298,914 148,833 
USA 4,343,233 5,551,527 3,497,670 
Total (Incl. Others) 8,130,683 10,241,646 7,727,370 
Source: UN, International Trade Statistics Yearbook, cited in The Europa 
World Year Book 1996, 37th Edition, Vol. II, K-2 (1996), 2412. 
External Payment Debt 
The swelling debt service obligations, the enforced contraction of imports and the 
decline in oil exports were the three main characteristics of Nigeria's balance-of-payment 
difficulties in the 1980s. However, a sharp deterioration on the invisible account 
primarily due to rapidly rising interests in external debt, pushed the current account back 
into small deficits in 1987 and 1988, although it would have been significantly higher had 
debt-servicing requirements been met in full. In 1991, exports fell on weaker oil prices 
and import spending picked up strongly, leading to the trade surplus in dollar terms. 
Table 13 shows the balance of payments and Table 14 shows the external trade from 
1992 through 1994 respectively. 
TABLE 13 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (US $ MILLION) 
1992 1993 1994 
Exports of goods f.o.b. 11,791 9,910 9,459 
Imports of goods f.o.b. (7,181) (6,662) (6,511) 
Trade Balance 4,61 3,248 2,948 
Exports of services 1,053 1,163 371 
Imports of services (1,810) (2,726) (3,007) 
Balance on goods and services 3,853 1,685 312 
Other income received 156 58 49 
Other income paid (2,494) (3,335) (2,986) 
Balance on goods, services 1,515 (1,593) (2,626) 
and income 
Current transfers received 817 857 550 
Current transfers paid (64) (44) (52) 
Current balance 2,268 (780) (2,128) 
Direct investment from abroad 897 1,345 1,959 
Portfolio investment liabilities 1,884 (18) (27) 
Other investment assets (5,840) (1,345) (1,286) 
Other investment liabilities (4,725) (1,026) (317) 
Net errors and omissions (122) (88) (139) 
Overall balance (5,638) (1,911) (1,938) 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, cited in The Europa World Year 
Book 1996, 37th Edition, Vol. II, K-2 (1996), 2411. 
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TABLE 14 
EXTERNAL TRADE - PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES 
(imports by SITC sections, N million) 
1991 1992 1993 
Food and live animals 7,785.5 11,738.4 13,912.9 
Crude materials (inedible) except fuels 2,147.7 3,578.8 4,306.4 
Animal and vegetable oil and fats 715.9 1,002.1 1,325.0 
Chemicals 15,302.5 25,910.4 28,322.6 
Basic manufacturers 21,029.7 32,924.8 39,751.1 
Machinery and transport equipment 37,674.5 59,837.2 70,226.9 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 4,116.5 7,014.4 6,293.9 
Total (incl. Others) 89,488.2 143,151.2 165,629.4 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos, and Federal Office of Statistics. 1994 
(N million): Total imports c.i.f. 143,226 (IMF, International 
Financial Statistics), 98. 
CHAPTER VI 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
This chapter presents the analysis of data collected for the study. The data were 
presented in tabular form. The frequency-percentage technique was used in the 
presentation. Analysis of data collected from the survey were based on research 
questionnaires. For explicity, data from foreign direct investments, Nigerians and CEOs 
were collected independently and presented jointly. 
Presentation of Findings 
Data were collected from: 
i. Foreign direct investments operating in Nigeria 
ii. Nigerian nationals 
iii. CEOs of indigenous companies in Nigeria. 
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TABLE 15 
NUMBER OF YEARS RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN 
WITH THEIR ORGANIZATION 
30% 
II year or less H B etween 2 and 5 • Between 5 and 8 • Between 8 and 11 
years years years 
I Between 11 an d 14 B Between 14 and 17 • 17 years and more 
years years 
Figure 3. Number of Years Respondents Have Been with Their Organization. 
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Descriptive Results 
Research Question #1: Researcher wants to know the number of years 
respondents have been with their organization. 
As Table 15 and Figure 3 depicted, 30.67 percent of the respondents had served 
their organizations for between 5 and 8 years. While 22 percent of the respondents had 
served between 11 years and 14 years. About 17.14 percent had served their firm for 
five years or less while 12 percent had service records of fifteen years or more. Finally, 
18 percent had spent between 11 and 14 years. 
These statistics suggest that a significant percentage of the respondents had the 
opportunity to familiarize themselves with their companies' policies, particularly with 
how top management perceives Nigerian public policy on foreign investment. 
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TABLE 16 
NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO WORK FOR RESPONDENTS' FIRM 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
299 Employees or less 5 3.333 
Between 300 and 499 employees 23 15.333 
Between 500 and 599 employees ,5 10.000 
Between 600 and 699 employees 37 24.667 
[Between 700 and 899 employees 31 20.667 
Between 900 and 999 employees 17 11.333 
Between 1000 and 1500 employees 13 8.667 
Between 1501 and more employees 9 6.000 
Cumulative Total 150 100.000 
25% 
• 299 Employees or • Between 300 and 
less 499 employees 
• Between 700 and B Between 900 and 
899 employees 999 employees 
• Between 500 and • Between 600 and 
599 employees 699 employees 
• Between 1000 and • Between 1501 and 
1500 employees more employees 
Figure 4. Number of People who Work for Respondents' Firm. 
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Research Question #2: Researcher wants to know the number of people 
that respondents' firm employ. 
Table 16 and Figure 4 show that 24.67 percent of the companies represented had 
employees of between 600 and 699 people and 20.67 percent employ between 700 and 
899 people. These figures help to validate the findings of this study, because most of the 
foreign investors operating in Nigeria employ between 750 and 1,500 employees.1 
Therefore with a combined total of 71.3 percent employing between 600 and 
1,500 or more people, the companies represented in this study are in this respect similar 
to the general population of foreign investors in N igeria. Only 28.67 of the companies 
employ 600 or fewer people compared with the 71.3 percent which employ 600 and more 
people. However, only 3.3 percent of the companies employ 299 people or less while 
15.3 percent employ between 300 and 499 people. This however, does not significantly 
affect the finding of the study. 
'Frank Osunde, Major Nigerian Companies (Lagos: Ikoyi Publishers, 1982), 7. 
TABLE 17 
NUMBER OF ALIENS EMPLOYED BY RESPONDENTS' FTRM 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
NUMBER OF ALIENS EMPLOYED FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
9 aliens or less 33 22.000 
Between 10 and 19 aliens 39 26.000 
Between 20 and 29 aliens 25 16.667 
letween 30 and 39 aliens 23 15.333 
Between 40 and 49 " 17 11.333 
Between 50 and 59 aliens 9 6.000 
Between 60 and more aliens 4 2.667 
Cumulative Total 150 100.000 
26% 
19 aliens or less 0 Between 10 and 19 • Between 20 and 29 • Between 30 and 39 
aliens aliens aliens 
I Between 40 and 49 • Between 50 and 59 • Between 60 and 
aliens aliens more aliens 
Figure 5. Number of Aliens Employed by Respondents' Firm. 
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Table 17 and Figure 5 show that 22 percent of the companies represented 
employed between 9 aliens or less while 26 percent of the companies employed between 
10 and 19 aliens. Since no data were available on the average number of aliens employed 
by foreign investors in Nigeria, it is not possible to determine how closely these figures 
approximate the actual number of aliens employed by foreign enterprises. However, 
16.67 percent of the respondents employ between 20 and 29 aliens while 15.33 percent 
employ between 30 and 39 aliens in the study. Finally, 20 percent of the respondents 
employ between 40 and 60 and more aliens. This is true because the Nigerian 
government's regulation of foreign subsidiaries requires alien companies to reduce the 
number of their expatriates and replace them with Nigerians. 
Analysis and Interpretation of the Findings 
This section presents the results of the investigation that was derived from the 
responses to the research questionnaire. The research questions were designed after a 
thorough review of the Nigerian political environment and those pieces of legislation on 
foreign investment were primarily designed to encourage the inflow of foreign capital. 
To this end, foreign investors were granted many incentives, particularly in the form of 
tax relief. However, in an effort to regulate the activities of foreign establishments in 
Nigeria, General O. Obasanjo enacted the Nigerian enterprise promotion decree 
(Indigenization Decree) in 1977 as amended in 1979. 
A lot of these policy changes usually occur, especially as a new successful 
government will always moderate, eliminate or add to the policies that already exist. This 
is done to represent the interest of the people. The majority of the changes also affect the 
FDI. The researcher shall incorporate them into the research questionnaire and find out to 
what extent they impact on Nigeria. 
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TABLE 18 
WHAT MOTIVATES YOU TO ESTABLISH YOUR BUSINESS EN NIGERIA ? 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
• Political Stability 0 Cheap Labor Supply • Abundant Raw 
Materials 
O Profit Motive • Others (Please 
Specify) 
Fig. 6. What Motivates You to Establish Your Business in Nigeria? 
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Research Question #4 What Prompted the Foreign Direct Investors to 
Establish Their Companies in Nigeria? 
As Table 18 and Figure 6 show, 1.33 percent of the respondents said that it w as 
as a result of political stability that they decided to invest in Nigeria. On the other hand, 
16 percent and 9 percent of respondents claim that cheap labor supply and an abundant 
supply of raw materials, respectively, were their prime motives for investment in Nigeria. 
Finally, 73.33 percent of the respondents indicated that the retur n on investment was 
greater than perceived political instability in Nigeria. Therefore, they have invested in 
Nigeria based on profit motives. 
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TABLE 19 
PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL UNREST/MILITARY TAKE OVERS IN NIGERIA 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
19% 
• Not at all Frequent • Not Very Frequent • Somewhat Frequent D Very Frequent • Extremely Frequent 
Fig. 7. Perception of Political Unrest/Military Take Overs in Nigeria. 
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Research Question #5 How Foreign Investors Perceive Political 
Unrest/Military Takeovers in Nigeria 
As Table 19 and Figure 7 show, 1.333 percent and 2.67 percent of the 
respondents, respectively, maintain that the political unrest/military take overs are "not at 
all frequent" and "not very frequent." This means that a total of 4 percent of the 
respondents must not have been fully informed of the events that are happening in Nigeria 
or that they are gaining a lot from the military government to have given the above 
answer. However, 56 percent of the respondents commented they perceived the political 
unrest/military take overs as "very frequent." Also 18 percent concluded that the political 
unrest/military take overs occur "extremely frequent." This group of respondents have 
compared Nigerian political stability with that of Ghana as to say that Nigerian military 
take overs are "extremely frequent." Nonetheless, the final group of respondents (21.33 
percent) said that political/military interventions occur "somewhat frequent." Above all, a 
total of 74.67 percent maintain that political/military interventions occur more often than 
not. 
TABLE 20 
RESPONDENTS PERCEPTIONS OF NIGERIAN CONTROL OF FOREIGN 
BUSINESS WHEN THERE IS POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
PERCEPTIONS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
N,„ „ all reslr,clive 4 2.667 
No. verv restrictive 42 28.000 
Somewhat restrictive 86 57.333 
Verv restrictive 14 9.333 
Extreme!, restrictive 4 2.667 
Cumulative Total 150 100.000 
• Not at all restrictive • Not Very restrictive • Somewhat 
restrictive 
CI Very restrictive • Extremely restrictive 
Fig. 8. Respondents' Perceptions of Nigerian Control of Foreign Businesses 
when There is Political Instability. 
Research Question #6 Respondents' Perception of Nigerian Control 
of Foreign Business When There is Political 
Instability 
As shown in Table 20 and Figure 8, 57.33 percent of the respondents said that 
Nigerian control on foreign businesses are "somewhat restrictive." Although it is not 
certain why the majority of the subjects gave this answer, one possible explanation is that 
they wanted to avoid a controversial response. However, it is not unlikely that 57.33 
percent of the respondents compared Nigerian incentives and disincentive legislation on 
foreign investment before responding to this question. 
Another 28 percent of the respondents said that Nigerian controls over foreign 
business are "not very restrictive," compared with 9.33 percent who rated the controls as 
"very restrictive." However, 2.7 percent of the respondents answered that Nigerian 
controls on foreign businesses in Nigeria are "extremely restrictive" and "not at all 
restrictive" respectively. 
TABLE 21 
RESPONDENTS PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGES IN NIGERIAN 
GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN BUSINESSES 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
PERCEPTIONS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
Not at all restrictive 3 2.(X)0 
Not very restrictive 5 3.333 
Somewhat restrictive 33 22.000 
V ery restrictive 80 54.334 
Extremely restrictive 29 19.333 
Cumulative Total 150 100.000 
19% 
• Not at all restrictive II Not Very restrictive • Somewhat 
restrictive 
• Very restrictive • Extremely restrictive 
Fig. 9. Respondents' Perceptions of Changes in Nigerian Governmental Control 
of Foreign Businesses. 
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Research Question #7 Respondents' Perception of Changes in Nigerian 
Governmental Control of Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Table 21 and Figure 9 show that 53.33 percent of the respondents felt that 
changes in Nigerian governmental control of FDI are "very frequent." This is not 
surprising since successive Nigerian civilian and military administrations have been 
known to make frequent changes in the areas of profit repatriation, percentage of 
imported raw materials, and tax rates. 
Further buttressing this finding is the fact that an additional 19.33 percent of the 
respondents rated changes in Nigerian governmental controls of FDI as "extremely 
frequent." By contrast, only 3.33 percent of the subjects perceived these changes in 
governmental controls as "not very frequent." This last figure is statistically insignificant 
compared with the cumulative 72.66 percent derived from the "very frequent" and 
"extremely frequent" categories (53.33 and 19.33 respectively). Therefore the perception 
of foreign investors is that Nigerian governmental control of foreign investment is 
interrupted too much. This implies that an unstable FDI climate exists in Nigeria. 
TABLE 22 
PERCEPTION OF THE LEVEL OF MORALE OF FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTORS DOING BUSINESS IN NIGERIA 
DURING POLITICAL INSTABILITIES 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
PERCEPTIONS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
Not at all discouraging 0 0.000 
Not very discouraging 8 5.333 
Somewhat discouraging 56 37.333 
Very discouraging 70 46.666 
Extremely discouraging 16 10.666 
Cumulative Total 150 100.000 
1 1 %  
• Not at all 13 Not Very • Somewhat • Very discouraging • Extremely 
discouraging discouraging discouraging discouraging 
Fig. 10. Perception of the Level of Morale of Foreign Direct Investors Doing 
Business in Nigeria During Political Instabilities. 
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Research Question #8 Level of Morale of Foreign Investors in Business 
in Nigeria When There is Political Unrest 
As Table 22 and Figure 10 show, 46.67 percent of the respondents thought that 
the level of morale in business in Nigeria during periods of political unrest is "very 
discouraging to foreign investors." However, 37.33 percent of the respondents believed 
that the morale in doing business in Nigeria under political instability is only "somewhat 
discouraging to foreign investors." The fact that such a high percentage of the 
respondents exhibited a relatively neutral perception of political instability suggests that 
foreign investors probably do not feel very strongly that political instability could 
significantly discourage foreign investors from investing in Nigeria. In this situation, 
these respondents may have considered political instability in Nigeria the return on 
investment to have been able to come to their conclusion. 
Only 10.67 percent of the respondents said that political instability is "extremely 
discouraging to foreign investors." None of the respondents, however, rated political 
instability as "not at all discouraging to foreign investors." This is not surprising, since it 
is not likely that such restrictive environment would have a neutral effect on the inflow of 
foreign capita into the Nigerian economy. 
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TABLE 23 
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTION OF THE NIGERIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
CLIMATE 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
PERCEPTIONS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
•Not at all favorable 0 0.000 
Not very favorable 40 26.667 
Somewhat favorable 98 65.333 
Verv favorable 12 8.000 
Extremely favorable 0 0.000 
r • • r . Cumulative Total 150 100.000 
• Not at all favorable H Not very favorable • Somewhat favorable 
• Very favorable • Extremely favorable 
Fig. 11. Respondents' Perception of the Nigerian Foreign Investment Climate. 
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Research Question #9 The Perceptions of Foreign Investors on the 
Foreign Investment Climate in Nigeria 
Table 23 and Figure 11 show the Nigerian Foreign Investment Climate. Of the 
150 respondents who participated in this study, none perceived the Nigerian foreign 
investment climate to be "not at all favorable." Also, none of the respondents described 
the foreign investment climate as "extremely favorable." These findings can be explained 
by taking into account the fact that, as discussed in the previous chapter, Nigeria has 
promulgated numerous laws and decrees with concessions to foreign investors. Hence, it 
is not surprising that none of the subjects described the nation's foreign investment 
climate as "not at all favorab le." 
The finding suggests that the Nigerian investment climate is not judged to be 
totally unfavorable by foreign investors. It is pro bable that none of the respondents rated 
the investment climate as "extremely favorable" because of the restrictive regulations 
implemented by the Nigerian government in the post-civil war era to control the activities 
of foreign establishment (Indigenization decree prorogation 1972). 
A majority of the respondents (65.33%) described Nigeria's Foreign investment 
climate as "somewhat favorable." Perhaps the respondents in this category took into 
consideration Nigeria's "incentive" and "disincentive" legislation and decrees in their 
estimation of the nation's foreign investment climate. The results of their analyses 
probably compelled them to conclude that the investment climate is "somewhat favorable" 
or "somewhat unfavorable." This reaction seems to suggest that the i nvestment climate is 
favorable enough to justify the presence of foreign enterprises. However, 26.67 percent 
of the respondents determined that the Nigerian foreign investment climate is "not very 
favorable." One possible explanation for the reaction of these respondents is that they 
only took Nigeria's restrictive regulations into consideration, to the exclusion of the 
nation's incentive-related legislation on foreign investment. Only 8 percent of the 
respondents determined that the climate is "very favorable" for foreign investment. 
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TABLE 24 
THE DEGREE EACH SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE 
IN CREATING A CONDUCIVE CLIMATE FOR 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
PERCEPTIONS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
Not at ail supportive of foreign 
investment 
24 16.000 
Not very supportive of foreign 
investment 
110 73.333 
Somewhat supportive of foreign 
investment 
14 9.333 
Very supportive of foreign 
investment 
2 1.333 
Extremely supportive of foreign 
investment 
0 0.000 
Cumulative Total 150 100.000 
• Not at all supportive of H Not very supportive of • Somewhat supportive of • Very supportive of 
foreign investment foreign investment foreign investment foreign investment 
Fig. 12. The Degree Each Successive Government Has Been Supportive in Creating 
a Conducive Climate for Foreign Investment in Nigeria. 
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Research Question #10 The Degree To Which Each Successive 
Government2 Has Been Supportive of the 
Creation of A Conducive Climate For Foreign 
Investors in Nigeria 
Table 24 and Figure 12 show that an overwhelming majority of the respondents 
(73.33%) said that successive governments are "not very supportive of the foreign 
investment" climate. None of the respondents perceived the successive government to be 
"extremely supportive to the foreign investment" climate. Only 1.33 percent said the 
successive governments are "very supportive of the foreign investment" climate in 
Nigeria. 
However, 16 percent of the respondents judged the successive government to be 
"not at all supportive of the foreign investment" climate in Nigeria. Finally, only 9.33 
percent maintain that the s uccessive government is "somewhat supportive of the foreign 
investment" climate in Nigeria. 
2From 1960 to 1997, Nigeria has had ten different governments at the national 
level, led by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, General 
Yakubu Gowon, General Murtala Muhammad, General Obusegun Obasanjo, Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari, General Muhamadu Buhari, General Ibrahim Bahangida. Chief Ernest 
Shonekan, and General Sani Abacha. 
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TABLE 25 
EFFECT OF INDIGENIZATION ON FD1 IN NIGERIA 
QUESTION: WHAT EFFECT DO YOU THINK INDIGENIZATION 
HAD ON YOUR COMPANY? 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
BI ANSWER FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
^Discouraged equity participation 9 6.00 
Discouraged further diversification 97 64.67 
Bred inefficiency 31 20.67 
Other (please specify) 13 8.67 
Total 150 100.00 
21% 9% 
64% 
• Discouraged equity • Discouraged further • Bred inefficiency • Other (please specify) 
participation diversification 
Fig. 13. Effect of Indigenization on FDI in Nigeria. 
Question: What effect do you think Indigenization had on your company? 
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Research Question #11 The Effect That Indigenization Exercise Had 
on FDI 
A total of 150 questionnaires were distributed to FDI operating in Nigeria. Table 
25 and Figure 13 shows that 6 percent of the respondents asserted that the Indigenization 
exercise discouraged equity participation. Sixty-four point seven percent also agreed that 
it discouraged further expansion of their company portfolio in Nigeria, 20.67 percent 
declared that it bred inefficiency, while 8.67 percent gave varying reasons, such as being 
apprehensive of Nigerian laws affecting the FDI climate. 
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TABLE 26 
IMPACT OF NIGERIAN POLICY ON DIVIDEND AND CAPITAL REPATRIATION 
ON FDI IN NIGERIA (50% LIMIT ON FDI REPATRIATION OF EARNINGS) 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
ANSWER FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
Discourages further investment by 
•your company in Nigeria 
95 63.333 
[Encourages investment of 
unrepatriated income in Nigeria 
13 8.666 
Stifles research and development 
activity of your company 
20 13.333 
Causes saie of investment 20 13.333 
Others: Going out of Business 2 1.333 
Cumulative Total 150 100.000 
64% 
• Discourages further 
investment by your 
company in Nigeria 





income in Nigeria 
•Others: Going out of 
Business 
• Stifles research and 
development activity 
of your company 
Fig. 14. Impact of Nigerian Policy on Dividend and Capital Repatriation on FDI in 
Nigeria (50% limit on FDI Repatriation of Earnings). 
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Research Question #12 The Impact of Nigerian Policy on Dividend and 
Capital Repatriation (50% Limit on Foreign 
Investors' Repatriation of Earnings) 
Table 26 and Figure 14 show that 63.33 percent of the executives of the foreign 
investors studied asserted that Nigeria dividend and capital of repatriation policy 
"discourages further investment by their companies in Nigeria," 8.67 percent declared 
that it encourages investment in Nigeria. One group of 13.33 percent, and another 13.33 
percent declared respectively that it stifles research efforts and causes sale of investment. 
Only 1.33 percent had given varying responses, such as going out of business. The 
CEOs surveyed also identified poor policy on dividend repatriation as retarding foreign 
investment in Nigeria. 
One possible explanation for this unequivocal reaction is the desire for the foreign 
investors to repatriate a sizable percentage of their profits to their countries of origin. 
This desire, however, is directly at odds with one of the objectives of the Nigerian 
government, which is to compel foreign establishment to reinvest 50 percent or more of 
their profits in the Nigerian economy. 
Also, in Question #4 of the questionnaire administered to Nigerians, a majority 
(83%) declared that the Nigerian policy on dividends and capital repatriation on foreign 
investors discourages capital inflow into Nigeria. The CEOs surveyed also identified 
poor policy on divided repatriation as retarding foreign direct investment in Nigeria. 
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TABLE 27 
ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIAN TAX RATE 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
RESPONSE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
Excessively high 20 13.333 
High 100 66.667 
Moderate 30 20.000 
Low 0 0 
Too low 0 0 
Cumulative Total 150 100.000 
• Excessively high U High • Moderate • Low • Too low 
Fig. 15. Assessment of Nigerian Tax Rate. 
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Research Question #6 Designed for Nigerians. The group assessments 
tax rates and how they negatively affect 
Foreign Businesses 
The following response was obtained from Nigerians. Table 27 and Figure 15 
above depict that 13.33 percent of the respondents asserted that the Nig erian tax rate w as 
excessively high. A majority, 66.67 percent, declared the tax rate high, 20 percent agreed 
that it was moderate. None agreed that the tax rate was l ow or too low. 
Also, in Questions #8 and #9 of the questionnaire designed for CEO's of 
indigenous companies in Nigeria, they declared that the tax rates were high among other 
policies and that they negatively affected foreign investment in Nigeria. 
Research Question #13 Whether or not the Nigerian market and infra-
structural facilities were sufficient incentives 
to attract Foreign Direct Investment to Nigeria? 
From the data collected and analyzed, 97.33 percent of the respondents answered 
"no," which means that the market and infrastructural f acilities (support system) do not 
constitute sufficient incentives to attract Foreign Direct Investment to Nigeria. However, 
2.64 percent of the respondents answered yes," that there i s enough market potential and 
infrastructure that could give enough incentives to foreign investors. Moreover, in 
Questions #5a and #5b of the questionnaire designed for Nigerians, regarding the infra-




RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS REGARDING WHETHER NIGERIA WOULD 
HAVE ATTRACTED MORE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) 
IF SHE WAS POLITICALLY STABLE 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
PERCEPTIONS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
No, a, all likely 0 0.000 
No, very likely 16 10.667 
42 28.000 
Very likely 72 48.000 
Extremely likely 20 13.333 
Cumulative Total 150 100.000 
13% 
• Not at all likely • Not very likely • Somewhat likely • Very likely •Extremely likely 
Fig. 16. Respondents' Perceptions Regarding Whether Nigeria Would Have Attracted 
More Foreign Direct Investment if She was Politically Stable. 
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Research Question #14 The Perceptions of Whether Nigeria Would 
Have Attracted More Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) if the Political Environment Had 
Been Stable 
Table 28 and Figure 16 show that 48 percent of the respondents said that it is 
"very likely" that Nigeria would have attracted more foreign direct investo rs if the political 
environment had been stable. In contrast, none of the respondents believed that it i s "not 
at all likely" that Nigeria would have attracted more foreign investment if the country was 
politically stable. 
Furthermore, 13.33 percent of the respondents believed that it is "extremely 
likely" that Nigeria would have attracted more foreign capital if the political environment 
had been stable. Hence, the majority of the respondents felt that it i s likely that Nigeria 
would have attracted more foreign capital if the political environment had been stable. 
By the same token, this same question was also presented to the Nigerian CEOs 
respectively, that Nigeria would have attracted more foreign investors if it was politically 
stable. To Nigerians, 50 percent said "very likely" and 15 percent sa id "extremely 
likely." This constitutes 65 percent who were highly in favor of the fact that Nigeria 
would have attracted more foreign direct investors if there was political stability. 
However, 72 percent of the CEOs agreed ("very likely and extremely likely") that Nigeria 
would have attracted more foreign investors had the political environment been stable. 
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TABLE 29 
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS REGARDING WHETHER NIGERIA WOULD 
HAVE ATTRACTED MORE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IF LAWS LIMITING 
REPATRIATION OF PROFITS HAD NOT BEEN IMPOSED 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
I, PERCEPTIONS FREOUENCY PERCENTAGE 
No, ,, all likely 0 0.000 
Nol very likely 14 9.333 
Somerrhal likely 46 30.667 
Very likely 82 54.667 
Extremely likely 8 5.333 
150 100.000 
• Extremely likely • Not at all likely B Not very likely • Somewhat likely • Very likely 
Fig. 17. Respondents' Perceptions Regarding Whether Nigeria Would Have Attracted 
More Foreign Investment if Laws Limiting Repatriation of Profits Had Not Been 
Imposed. 
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Research Question #15 Respondents' Perception of Whether Nigeria 
Would Have Attracted More Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) if Laws Limiting Repatriation 
of Profit Had Not Been Imposed 
Research Questions #15 and #16 were presented taking into account the harsh 
Nigerian Indigenization Decree promoted to regulate the activities of foreign investment in 
Nigeria. 
Table 29 and Figure 17 show that 54.67 percent of the respondents believe that it 
is "very likely" that Nigeria would have attracted more foreign capital if laws limiting 
repatriation of profit had not been imposed. The fact that none of the respondents 
answered "not at all likely" suggests that foreign investors consider this policy to be a 
major impediment to investment in a foreign country (Nigeria). Only 5.33 percent of the 
respondents thought it "extremely likely" that Nigeria would have attracted more foreign 
capital if laws limiting repatriation of profit were not imposed. However, 9.33 percent of 
the respondents believed that it is "not very likely" compared with a cumulative total of 60 
percent who determined that it is likely that N igeria would have attracted more foreign 
direct investment if laws limiting repatriation of profit had not been imposed. 
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TABLE 30 
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS REGARDING WHETHER NIGERIA WOULD 
HAVE ATTRACTED MORE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IF CERTAIN 
INDUSTRIES HAD NOT BEEN EXCLUSIVELY 
RESERVED FOR NIGERIANS 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
PERCEPTIONS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
Not at all likely 0 0.000 
Not very likely 18 12.000 
Somewhat likely 55 36.667 
Very likely 73 48.667 
Extremely likely 4 2.667 
Cumulative Total 150 100.000 
37% 
• Not at all likely • Not very likely • Somewhat likely • Very likely • Extremely likely 
Fig. 18. Respondents' Perceptions of Whether Nigeria Would Have Attracted More 
Foreign Investment If Certain Industries Had Not Been Exclusively Reserved for 
Nigerians. 
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Research Question #16 Perception of Whether Nigeria Would Have 
Attracted More Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
if Certain Industries Had Not been Exclusively 
Reserved for Nigerians 
To 48.67 percent of the respondents, it is "very likely" that N igeria would have 
attracted more foreign direct investment if certain industries were not exclusively reserved 
for Nigerians. In Table 30 and Figure 18, however, 36.67 percent of the respondents 
believed that it is only "somewhat likely." Another 12 percent of the respondents 
believed that it is "not very l ikely" that Nigeria would have attracted more foreign capital 
in the absence of this regulation, compared to 2.67 percent who thought it "extremely 
likely." 
Research Question #17 Perception of Whether Restriction of Employ­
ment of Aliens (Expatriate Quotas) is Deterring 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria 
About 146, or 97.33 percent, of the respondents from FDI declared "yes" while 
only 2.64 percent declared "no." In the same vein, the same question was given to both 
Nigerians and the CEOs in Questions #10 and #9 designed for them respectively. Here, 
80 percent of Nigerians asserted that such restrictions discourage foreign direct 
investment in Nigeria. The majority, 83.33 percent (about 25 CEOs out of the 30 
surveyed) of the CEOs identified the restriction of employment of aliens as one of the 
policies that negatively affect foreign direct investment in Nigeria. 
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Research Questions #18 and #19 were designed to address the 
foreign direct investors. And similar questions, 6.11 and 6.12 were 
designed to address Nigerians; the researcher wants to know the 
effectiveness of political and technological conditions in attracting foreign 
direct investment into Nigeria. 
In Question #18, 97.33 percent asserted that it is "very di scouraging," for FDI, 
and in Question #19, 97.33 percent responded in the negative, maintaining that p olitical 
conditions in Nigeria are not encouraging foreign investment in the country. Also, in 
Questions #11 and #12 addressing Nigerians on whether the political situation and 
technological advancement in Nigeria attract foreign direct investment, 80 percent of the 
respondents answered "no," while 20 percent responded in the affirmative. 
Research Questions #20, #13 and #10 were designed to address 
both the FDI, Nigerians and the CEOs respectively; the researcher wants 
to know whether the Nigerian investment climate (with the presence of 
political instability) encourages Foreign Direct Investment (IDI) in 
Nigeria. 
The following response was obtained. Table 31 shows that 94.67 percent of 
FDI, Nigerians, and CEOs felt that when there is political unrest in Nigeria, the 
investment climate would not be encouraging for foreign direct investment in Nigeria. On 
the other hand, 5.33 percent, 12 percent and 13.33 percent of FDI. Nigerians and CEOs 
respectively responded to the above question. 
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Research Questions #21, #14 and #8 were designed for FDI, 
Nigerians and CEOs to address the issue of whether some government 
policies actually discourage foreign direct investment, and the following 
response was obtained. 
As Table 32 shows, 94 percent, 85 percent and 90 percent of the respondents 
(FDI, Nigerians and CEOs) respectively agreed that some government policies on FDI in 
Nigeria retard foreign direct investment whereas 6 percent, 15 percent and 10 percent of 
the respondents (FDI, Nigerians and CEOs) respectively disagreed by selecting the 
answer "no" that is to say that some Nigerian government policies "do not" discourage 
foreign direct investment. 
Furthermore, in Research Question #15 designed for Nigerians, an 
attempt was made to ascertain the source of foreign capital that possesses 
the greatest force in putting the country into the path of fast development, 
and the following response was obtained. 
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TABLE 31 
RESPONDENTS' REACTION TO NIGERIAN INVESTMENT 
CLIMATE UNDER INSTABILITY 
QUESTION: Do you think that Nigeria's Investment Climate Encourages Foreign Direct 
Investment in Nigeria when there is Political Instability? 
"NO" "YES" TOTAL 
Frequency (FDI) 142 8 150 
Frequency (CEOs) 88 12 100 
Frequency 
(Nigerians) 26 4 30 
Cumulative Total of 
Frequency 280 
"NO" "YES" %TOTAL 
Percentage (FDI) 94.67% 5.33% 100.00% 
Percentage 
(Nigerians) 88.00% 12.00% 100.00% 
Percentage 










I "NO" a "YES" 
Fig. 19. Respondents' Reaction to Nigerian Investment Climate Under Instability. 
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TABLE 32 
RESPONDENTS' REACTION TO EFFECTIVENESS OF SOME NIGERIAN 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
QUESTION: In your opinion, do you think that som e Nigerian government Economic 
Policies on Foreign Direct Investment discourage FDI in Nigeria? 
"YES" "NO" TOTAL 
Frequency (FDI) 141 9 150 
Frequency 
(Nigerians) 
85 15 100 
Frequency (CEOs) 27 3 30 
Cumulative Total of 
Frequency 280 
"YES" "NO" %TOTAL 
Percentage (FDI) 94% 6% 100.00% 
Percentage 
(Nigerians) 85% 15% 100.00% 
Percentage 
(CEOs) 90% 10% 100.00% 
Percentage (FDI) Percentage (Nigerians) Percentage (CEOs) 
6% 15% 10% 
• YES • NO •"YES" 0"NO" •"YES" • "NO 
Fig. 20. Respondents' Reaction to Effectiveness of Some Nigerian Government Policies 
on Foreign Direct Investment. 
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TABLE 33 
EXTERNAL FINANCING SOURCE WITH HIGHEST PROMISING 
DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY 
(Which of the Following Do You Think Possesses More Potential of Ushering 
Faster Rate of Economic Development?) 
(N = 150 Respondents) 
ANSWER FREOUENCY PERCENTAGE 
Foreign Investment 85 55.666 
External Loans 10 6.667 
Foreign Aids 40 26.667 
External Grants 15 10.000 
Others (please specify) 0 0 
Total 150 100 
• Foreign Investment a External Loans • Foreign Aids a External Grants 
Fig. 21. External Financing Source with Highest Promising Development Capacity 
(Which of the Following Do You Think Possesses More Potential of Ushering 
Faster Rate of Economic Development?). 
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Research Question #19 Designed for Nigerians. Research the source of 
foreign capital that possesses greatest force in 
putting a country into path of fast development. 
Table 33 and Figure 21 reveal that 55.66 percent of the respondents agreed that 
foreign investment possesses greatest capacity of ushering the country into a path of 
faster rate of development. 6.67 percent, 26.67 percent, and another 10.00 percent ot the 
respondents declared that external loans, foreign aid and external grants respectively 
possess such capacity. 
Summary of Findings 
The primary objective of this research was to ascertain the perceptions of the 
impact of political instability on FDI in Nigeria. The results are as follows: 
(1) Nigerian control on foreign businesses are "somewhat restrictive." 
(2) Changes in Nigerian government controls of foreign businesses are "very 
frequent." 
(3) The level of morale of foreign direct investors doing business in Nigeria is 
low. 
(4) Nigerian political instability is "very discouraging to foreign investors." 
(5) The Nigerian foreign investment climate is "somewhat favorable" enough as 
to justify the presence of foreign enterprises. 
(6) The Indigenization Decree in Nigeria serves as a disincentive to FDI. 
(7) Nigerian policies on dividend and capital repatriation "discourage further 
FDI in Nigeria." 
(8) The Nigerian market and infrastructural facilities do not constitute enough 
incentives for foreign direct investment in Nigeria. 
(9) The Nigerian tax rate is "high." 
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(10) It is "very likely" that Nigeria would have attracted more foreign direct 
investment (FDI) if it had been politically stable. 
(11) It is "very likely" that Nigeria would have attracted more foreign investment 
if laws limiting repatriation of profits had not been imposed. 
(12) It is "very likely" that Nigeria would have attracted more foreign direct 
investment if certain industries were not exclusively reserved for Nigerians. 
(13) The Nigerian expatriate quota on foreign businesses is "somewhat 
discouraging" to foreign direct investors. 
(14) Political and technological conditions are "not attractive enough" to 
encourage Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
(15) The Indigenization era led to the erosion of foreign direct investors' 
confidence in Nigeria. 
(16) Most of the companies operating in Nigeria started before the promulgation 
of the Indigenization Decree, most for profit motive and scarcely as a result 
of specific incentive by the government. 
(17) The level of foreign investment in Nigeria is not commensurate with the 
level of incentive given by the Nigerian government. 
(18) The rate of increase of stock of foreign investment in Nigeria is appalling. 
(19) Existing foreign investors will invest more in Nigeria if lapses in existing 
policies are amended. 
Analysis of Data Presented (Part I) 
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Test of Validity of Hypothesis 
The first task in analysis of data presented is test of the validity of the hypothesis 
formulated in Chapter I. Personal interviews and research questionnaires form the basis 
of data collection for testing the hypothesis. 
Hypothesis I 
1. (H°) - Some Nigerian Government Economic Policies Discourage Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in Nigeria. 
(H1) - Some Nigerian Government Economic Policies Do Not Discourage Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in Nigeria. 
In order to arrive at a statistically acceptable inference, our conclusion should be 
made taking into account the following statements. If the calculated chi-square fall in the 
upper or lower rejection region, then we reject the Null hypothesis (HO) and accept the 
alternative hypothesis (HI). If the calculation falls within the area bounded by the upper 
and lower region, then we accept the Null hypothesis. 
In testing this hypothesis, we use data collected from Research Questions #20, 




RESPONDENTS' ANSWERS ON TABLE 32 





Foreign Direct Investors 141 9 150 
Nigerians 85 15 100 
CEOs Personnel 27 3 30 
Column Total 253 27 280 
We obtain the expected frequency by using the Formula 
CTxR 
EF = GT 





CALCULATION OF EXPECTED FREQUENCY 
Yes Column No Column Total 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
141 135.5 9 14.5 150 
85 90.4 15 9.6 100 
27 27.1 3 2.9 30 
Total 253 27 280 
Formula X2 = Y. tO - E)2 
E = CHI-SQUARE 
Where X2 Chi-Square 
O = Observed frequency 
E = Expected frequency 
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0.2232 + 0.3225 = 0.0004 + 2.862 + 3.0375 + 0.0034 = 5.6732 
Degree of Freedom (V) = (h - 1) (K - 1) 
= (2 - 1) (3 - 1) 
=  1 x 2  
= 2 
where v = degree of freedom 
h = number of cases 
k = number of categories 
At 5 percent level of significance, critical value for X22 (0.05) = 5.991 
Also at 10 percent level of significance, critical value for X22 (0.10) = 9.236 
Decision Rule 
Accept Null Hypothesis if at 5% and at 10% X2 = 5.991 
X2 = 9.236 
That is as a result of political instability, some Nigerian government economic 
policies discourage (FDI). If the above decision rule is not so, reject Null Hypothesis 
and accept alternative hypothesis. 
From the above, at 5 percent significance level, the test is significant, the 
computation is less than the critical value at 5 percent level of significance. Hence, we 
accept the Null Hypothesis: - some Nigerian government economic policies discourage 
foreign direct investment in Nigeria and reject the alternative hypothesis. 
Also, at 10 percent, the critical value is greater than the observed value, hence the 
observed value falls into the acceptance region. 
Hypothesis II 
II. (H°) - Nigerian Political Instability Discourages Foreign Direct Investment in 
Nigeria. 
(H1) - Nigerian Political Instability does not Discourage Foreign Direct Investment in 
Nigeria. 
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We tested this hypothesis (HI) using responses from questions 26, 18, and 10 of 




Classes of Respondents Yes No Total 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
8 142 150 
Nigerians 12 88 100 
CEOs 4 26 30 
24 256 280 
TABLE 37 
COMPUTATION OF EXPECTED FREQUENCY AND CHI-SQUARE 
Observed Frequency Expected Frequency Column 
Total & Row Grand Total 
X2 
8 12.9 1.8612 
12 8.6 1.3442 
4 2.6 0.7538 
142 137.1 0.1751 
88 81.4 0.1265 
26 27.4 0.0715 
Total 280 280 1X2=4.3323 
At 5 percent of significance critical value X22 (0.05) = 5.991 
Observed value = 4.3323 
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Decision Rule 
If at 5 percent of significance < X2 = 5.911 and at 10 percent of signilicance = 
X2 < 9.236 we accept the Null Hypothesis i.e. - Nigerian political instability discourages 
foreign direct investment in Nigeria. But if X2 > 5.991 at 5 percent or X2 > 9.236 at 10 
percent we reject the Null Hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis. 
Decision 
At 5percent of significance, the critical value is greater than the observed value 
hence the observed value will fall within the acceptance region. That is, Nigerian political 
instability discourages foreign direct investors. 
Other Findings (Part II) 
Data analysis also revealed a lot of information on foreign direct investment in 
Nigeria. It was agreed by the majority of the respondents that foreign direct investment 
has a better promising future for Nigerian economic development effort than other 
sources of foreign direct investment. It was discovered that enough of foreign investment 
is not flowing into the country. It was ascertained that the country's investment climate 
was unconducive for attracting such scarce resource (foreign capital). In the same view, 
some Nigerian government economic policies were negatively affecting the flow of 
foreign investment in Nigeria. In the researcher's personal interview with some of the 
CEOs, the Nigerian environment was described as being hostile. 
Infrastructurally, Nigeria is considered to be underdeveloped. A majority of FDI 
and Nigerians believe that the existing level of infrastructure does not encourage foreign 
direct investment in Nigeria. Infrastructure facilities in Nigeria fall among the least 
developed in the "Third World," not only in level of efficiency and reliability but also in 
level of maintenance. 
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Political instability discouraged foreign direct investment in Nigeria. 
Respectively, 97.33 percent and 80 percent of FDI and Nigerians were of the view that 
political instability (investment climate) in Nigeria possesses uncertain characteristic that 
should be closely watched. Nigeria is among the Third World countries fraught with 
high volatility in terms of changing governments. According to some CEOs and 
executives of Foreign Direct Investors, each new government comes with new policies 
that may render unviable already implemented projects. It was discovered that the 
majority of foreign firms operating in Nigeria established their businesses due to the 
perceived profits to be made. 
The Indigenization exercise was discovered to be a major factor hindering foreign 
direct investment in Nigeria. In response to Question #6 of questionnaire for FDI. 65.33 
percent of the Foreign Direct Investors in Nigeria asserted that it ma kes foreign investors 
unsure of the environment. It i s equally revealed that Ni gerian policy on dividend and 
capital repatriation is stringent and discourages further investment by the existing foreign 
direct investors in the Nigerian economy. 63.33 percent of the respondents (FDI) were 
of the above view. 
Also, the unstable exchange rate regime, restrictions on employment of aliens, 
and absence of effective legal protection of foreign investors were among the reasons that 
the CEOs gave in their answer to Question #9 of the questionnaire (Appendix IV) 
designed for them on the policies negatively affecting foreign direct investment in 
Nigeria. 
By and large, the situation whereby Nigerian political instability and some 
economic policies are repulsive to foreign direct investment is a serious issue that should 
be given due attention. The situation, though critical, is equally amenable. 
CHAPTER VE 
CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of the present study was to determine the perceptions of the 
impact created by political instability on foreign direct investments in Nigeria. The role of 
FDI in ushering Nigeria into the path of fast economic development is indisputable. 
Studies have revealed that on a comparable ground, foreign direct investments provide the 
greatest development impact over any other external source of finance. 
FDI as viewed from an extension of financial, technical and managerial resources 
are highly desired in Nigeria. To make this a reality, the Nigerian government has for 
many years pursued a vigorous policy of encouraging FDI through extension of nexus of 
incentives to entice foreign direct investors. In spite of the innumerable incentives and 
coupled with the fact that Nigeria is a country with abundant mineral resources that are 
generating attractive investment opportunities, foreign investments are flowing into the 
country at a miserable rate when the rate of inflow into other countries with lower natural 
endowments is considered. 
The appalling situation has been traced to lapses in some of the policies on FDI 
and a highly repulsive investment climate. Some of the policies on FDI include the 
following: rules on dividend and capital repatriation are very stringent; registration 
procedures of new companies are quite ambiguous; restrictions on employment of aliens 
are inconsistent with what exists in other countries; the tax regime is very ambivalent. 
Also, political and economic conditions are very unstable; the level of infra­
structure is still low. These elements of the policies and political/economic environment 
have combined and compelled foreign direct investors to stigmatize Nigeria as a high risk 
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investment zone. The reason a majority of the investors gave as to why they continued to 
invest is that return on investment is greater than the perceived high risk. 
The researcher has therefore recommended the following: granting of customs 
duty exemptions on plant and machinery to be used by a foreign concern in establishing a 
firm in Nigeria; abrogation of restrictions on employment of aliens; moderating rules 
governing dividend and capital repatriation; and enhancing tax incentives. 
Recommendations for Attracting FD1 into Nigeria 
In view of this study's finding that the Nigerian political/economic environment 
along with some economic policies discourages foreign direct investments, the following 
are recommended: 
Improve Political Stability and Security of Investment 
Political stability and security of life and property in the capital importing country 
is the first condition towards a favorable climate for inflow of foreign direct investment. 
Basically, these two variables are outside the economist's view, but they are necessary 
ingredients that should not be overlooked. In this regard, the Nigerian government is 
urged to establish separate insurance policies for foreign firms operating in the country as 
a way to prove to foreign investors the security of the capital of foreign investors. 
Nigeria has been stigmatized as a politically unstable environment. The federal 
government should intensify efforts to make re-introduction of democracy a reality come 
1998, and institute a policy barring the military from unnecessary intervention in the 
political affairs of the country. 
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Customs Duty Exemptions 
Concrete steps should be taken to encourage greater inflow of FDI into Nigeria by 
granting exemptions from customs duty on plants and machinery imported by foreign 
industries for the setting up of industries in Nigeria. Assistance should also be given to 
the foreign firm on information regarding legal matters, labor recruitment, location of 
industry and all other relevant issues. 
Abrogation Of Policy Restricting Employment Of Aliens 
Statistics show that a majority of the population of Nigerians is in the unskilled 
labor category. The establishment of a new industrial concern requires experienced staff 
to staff the positions. Since the Nigerian labor market, in most cases, lacks such 
experienced personnel, it will amount to outright discouragement if foreign investors are 
not allowed to employ expatriates for the smooth take-off of the new industries. 
Aliens should be allowed to be employed, but not indiscriminately to starve the 
Nigerian labor market. 
Increased Tax Incentives 
Though the Nigerian government has increased the amount of tax concessions to 
foreign investors in Nigeria, additional tax incentives are deemed necessary. In this 
regard, the researcher advocates the increase of capital allowance, abrogation of 
withholding taxes on dividends and a reduction of the company tax rates from 40 percent 
to 35 percent. 
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Others 
I. Nigerian policy makers should avoid frequent foreign investment policy 
changes. This is important because foreign investors need a stable environment in which 
to operate. 
D. The Nigerian government should eschew the use of retroactive decrees. This 
would assist in alleviating the fears of foreign investors. 
III. In as much as Nigerian policy makers agree that the natio n's economy needs 
the infusion of foreign capital for rapid development, the government should establish a 
dialogue with foreign investors to determine their primary area of concern. This should 
lead to the formulation of mutually beneficial policies and increased infusion of foreign 
capital into the Nigerian economy. 
IV. The government should improve the political and economic environment 
through provision of infrastructural facilities, stabilize the Nigerian currency, improve the 
image of the police force, give equal treatment to foreign firms in all business affairs, and 
cultivate friendly attitudes. 
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APPENDIX I 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) QUESTIONNAIRE 
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESPONDENTS 
Azubuike I. Okechukwu, 
International Affairs & Development Program 
Clark Atlanta University 
Atlanta. GA 30314 
SOLICITATION SCRIPT 
My name is Innocent Okechukwu. I am conducting research as part of my doctoral 
dissertation at Clark Atlanta University. My dissertation deals with the "Perceptions of 
the Impact of Political Instability on Direct Foreign Investment in Nigeria." (1980-1993). 
I would like to meet with you briefly to discuss your ideas about topics related to political 
intervention and your businesses. You will receive a copy of the interview questions in 
advance of our meeting. 
The interview will be completely confidential. This project will lead to my success only if 
good people like you will help me. 
I would very much appreciate your assistance and cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Innocent Okechukwu 
cc: Dr. Ogbu Agburu, Advisor 
Dr. Konfor Masanje 
Dr. Christopher Jespersen 
1. What is the name of your organization? 
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2. What is your position in your organization? 
3. What nationality are you? 
4. How long have you been with this organization? 
5. Approximately how many people does your company employ? 
6. How many foreigners (aliens) are currently employed by your company? 
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7. Between 1980 and 1993 what prompted the establishment of your company in 
Nigeria? 
A. Profit motive 
B. Political stability • 
C. Abundance of raw materials • 
D. Cheap labor supply 
E. Other (please specify) 
8. Between 1980 and 1993 how frequently did you consider Nigerian government 
political unrest/military take over? 
A. Not at all frequent 
B. Not very frequent 
C. Somewhat frequent • 
D. Very frequent • 
E. Extremely frequent 
9. What is your perception of Nigerian control of foreign businesses between 1980 
and 1993 when there was political instability? 
A. Not at all restrictive Ql 
B. Not very restrictive • 
C. Somewhat restrictive 
D. Very restrictive 
E. Extremely restrictive • 
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10. Between 1980 and 1993 what was your perception of changes of Nigerian 
government control of foreign business? 
A. Not at all frequent • 
B. Not very frequent • 
C. Somewhat frequent • 
D. Very frequent • 
E. Extremely frequent • 
11. Between 1980 and 1993 what was your level of morale in doing business in 
Nigeria when there was political instability? 
A. Not at all discouraging to foreign investors • 
B. Not very discouraging to foreign investors • 
C. Somewhat discouraging to foreign investors • 
D. Very discouraging to foreign investors • 
E. Extremely discouraging to foreign investors • 
12. As a result of political instability between 1980 and 1993, the foreign investment 
climate in Nigeria was: 
A. Not at all favorable • 
B. Not very favorable • 
C. Somewhat favorable • 
D. Very favorable • 
E. Extremely favorable • 
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Between 1980 and 1993 to what degree have successive governments been 
supportive in creating a conducive climate for your business in Nigeria? 
A. Not at all supportive to foreign investors • 
B. Not very supportive to foreign investors • 
C. Somewhat supportive to foreign investors • 
D. Very supportive to foreign investors • 
E. Extremely supportive to foreign investors • 
Between 1980 and 1993, what effect has the Indigenization decree promulgated 
by General Yakubu Gowon in 1972 as amended in 1977 had on your company in 
Nigeria? 
A. Discourages foreign equity participation • 
B. Discourages further diversification of your company in Nigeria • 
C. Breeds inefficiency • 
D. Other; please specify • 
Between 1980 and 1993, what impact do you think Nigeria's policy on income 
and capital repatriation has had on your company? 
A. Discourages further investment by your company in Nigeria • 
B. Encourage investment of unrepatriated income in Nigeria • 
C. Stifle research and development of your company • 
D. Causes sale of investment • 
E. Other LI 
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16. Between 1980 and 1993, do you consider the present level of infrastructure in 
Nigeria as a motivator to foreign investment in Nigeria? 
A. Yes G 
B. No Q 
17. Between 1980 and 1993, Nigeria would have attracted more foreign investment if 
there had been political stability. 
A. Not at all likely • 
B. Not very likely • 
C. Somewhat likely Qi 
D. Very likely • 
E. Extremely likely • 
18. Between 1980 and 1993, Nigeria would have attracted more foreign investments 
if laws limiting repatriation of profits were not imposed. 
A. Not at all likely • 
B. Not very likely • 
C. Somewhat likely • 
D. Very likely • 
E. Extremely likely • 
19. Between 1980 and 1993, Nigeria would have attracted more foreign investment if 
certain industries were not exclusively reserved for Nigerians. 
A. Not at all likely • 
B. Not very likely • 
C. Somewhat likely • 
D. Very likely 




20. Between 1980 and 1993, did you consider Nigerian restriction of employment of 
aliens as a deterrent to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
If "yes," what is your suggestion on recruitment policy that should be adopted. 
• 
• 
21. Between 1980 and 1993, what impact do you think Nigerian technological 
cultures had on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the country? 
A. Not at all discouraging to FDI 






C. Somewhat discouraging to FDI 
D. Very discouraging to FDI 
E. Extremely discouraging to FDI 
22. Between 1980 and 1993, do you think that the p olitical situation in Nigeria is 
encouraged Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
23. Between 1980 and 1993, do you think that Nigerian political/economic 
environment encouraged Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria? 
A. Yes G 




Between 1980 and 1993, do you think that some Nigerian government economic 







QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGNED FOR NIGERIANS 
Azubuike I. Okechukwu, 
International Affairs & Development Program 
Clark Atlanta University 
Atlanta, GA 30314 
SOLICITATION SCRIPT 
My name is Innocent Okechukwu. I am conducting research as part of my doctoral 
dissertation at Clark Atlanta University. My dissertation deals with the "Perceptions of 
the Impact of Political Instability on Direct Foreign Investment in Nigeria." (1980-1993). 
I would like to meet with you briefly to discuss your ideas about topics related to political 
intervention and your businesses. You will receive a copy of the interview questions in 
advance of our meeting. 
The interview will be completely confidential. This project will lead to my success only if 
good people like you will help me. 
I would very much appreciate your assistance and cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Innocent Okechukwu 
cc: Dr. Ogbu Agburu, Advisor 
Dr. Konfor Masanje 
Dr. Christopher Jespersen 
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1. What is your occupation? 
2. What is your opinion of the level of foreign investment in Nigeria? 
a. Low ^G 
b. Average • 
c. Above average • 
d. High G 
3. What effect do you think the Indigenization exercise has had on foreign 
investment in Nigeria? 
a. has reduced foreign participation • 
b. has increased rate of risk aversion • 
c. has discouraged capital flow into Nigeria • 
d. has caused the sale of investment • 
4. What effect do you think that Nigerian policy on income repatriation is having on 
foreign investment in Nigeria? 
a. It discourages FDI on further investment • 
b. It encourages FDI to re-invest the unrepatriated income • 
c. It causes FDI to sell their investment • 
d. It does not motivate FDI for investment expansion • 









What is your assessment of the Nigerian tax rate (i.e., general tax rate?) 





e. Too Low 
Do you think that the present de-regulation of financial markets is an incentive to 
foreign investment in Nigeria? 
Yes 
No 






























13. Do you think that Nigeria's political/investment climate is conducive to foreign 
investment in Nigeria? 
Yes Q 
No Ql 
14. Do you generally believe that some government policies retard foreign direct 




15. Which of the following do you think possesses more potential of ushering a faster 
rate of economic development? 
a. Foreign investment 
b. External loans • 
c. Foreign aids 
d. External grants • 
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APPENDIX III 
QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGNED FOR CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS 
(CEOs) OF NIGERIAN INDIGENOUS COMPANIES 
Azubuike I. Okechukwu, 
International Affairs & Development Program 
Clark Atlanta University 
Atlanta, GA 30314 
SOLICITATION SCRIPT 
My name is Innocent Okechukwu. I am conducting research as part of my doctoral 
dissertation at Clark Atlanta University. My dissertation deals with the "Perceptions of 
the Impact of Political Instability on Direct Foreign Investment in Nigeria." (1980-1993). 
I would like to meet with you briefly to discuss your ideas about topics related to political 
intervention and your businesses. You will receive a copy of the interview questions in 
advance of our meeting. 
The interview will be completely confidential. This project will lead to my success only if 
good people like you will help me. 
I would very much appreciate your assistance and cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Innocent Okechukwu 
cc: Dr. Ogbu Agburu, Advisor 
Dr. Konfor Masanje 
Dr. Christopher Jespersen 
1 .  Which of the companies do you represent in Nigeria? 
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2. What is your designation in your company? 
3. Do you consider Nigeria's economic relations with your company normal? 
Yes Q 
No Q 












7. What are those policies you consider as effective in attracting foreign investment 
in Nigeria? 
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9. If "Yes," what are those policies that negatively affect foreign investment in 
Nigeria? 
10. Do you think that Nigerian political and economic environments (investment 
climate) encourage foreign investment in Nigeria? 
Yes d 
No U 
11. Do you think that foreign direct investment possesses more development potential 
than any other source of foreign capital? 
Yes Ll 
No Q 
12. What recommendations would you advance for better policy initiatives? 
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GLOSSARY 
Balance of payment. All payments made from residents and nationals of one country to 
the rest of the world, and its receipts from other countries combined, therefore, 
the world's total import must equal export.1 
Black Africa. The geographical area commonly referred to as "Middle Africa" or "Africa 
South of the Sahara."2 It excludes the North, which is dominated by Arab 
countries having long histories of contact with European nations. Also excluded is 
the South, with a history of white dominance in South Africa/ The region in-
between, with thirty-odd countries, is referred to here as Black Africa. 
Capital goods. Assets that serve in the production of goods. Assets include buildings, 
plants, machinery or equipment such as assembly lines, and steel mills. Since 
they cannot be consumed, they represent the means of future production/ 
Domestic investment. This is always used to denote domestic fixed capital formation. 
Export promotion. A policy adopted by a host country (Nigeria) to encourage domestic 
enterprises to manufacture products that can be exported to foreign economies. 
One of the policy's advantages is believed to be improvement of the host 
country's foreign exchange position. 
Expropriation. The action of the state in taking or modifying the property right of foreign 
investor in the exercise of its sovereignty. This act is to deprive of possession or 
proprietary rights. Government actions, or government discontinuities all brought 
about by social, economic, or political imperatives existing in a country's internal 
or relevant external environment. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). "Any investment in another country which is carried out 
by a private company or individual, as opposed to government aid."5 
'Alan Gilpin, Dictionary of Economic Development in the Third World (New 
York: Longman, 1986), 610. 
2 Douglas A. L. Auid, et al., The American Dictionary of Economics (New York: 
Facts on File, 1983), 313. 
3 Claude S. Phillips, The African Political Dictionary (Santa Barbara, California: 
ABC - CLIO Information Services, 1982), 3-17. 
4 Douglas Greenwald, Encyclopedia of Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1982), 113. 
5David W. Pearce, MacMillan Dictionary of Modern Economics (London: 
MacMillan, 1986), 159. 
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Foreign exchange rate. The rate or rates at which the currency of a country is traded with 
the monetary units of other nations. Fixed rate, flexible rates, and net floating 
rates are variously employed by different countries.6 
Foreign investment. The institutional, individual, or government acquisition of assets in a 
foreign country. It includes both direct investment and portfolio investment and 
encompasses both public and private firms.7 
Government intervention. For the purpose of this study, the term government 
intervention is defined as a variety of political risks that a firm investing abroad is 
exposed to, those political risks that are associated with the actual and potential 
behavior of the host government. 
Host country. A country that plays host to foreign investors from other nations. The law 
and regulations of a host country can significantly affect the behavior of foreign 
investors. For example, hostile laws may discourage future foreign investment in 
a host country. 
Local resource content. The extent to which foreign enterprises utilize locally available 
raw materials in their production processes. It is believed that high local resource 
content helps alleviate the foreign exchange deficit of the host country. 
Multinational corporation. An international entity such as Exxon or General Motors that 
has its headquarters in one country but maintains operations and branch offices in 
numerous developed and developing countries.8 
The Nigerian naira (abbreviated "N"). Nigeria's official currency. To determine the 
equivalent value of figures represented in Nigerian currency (in this dissertation), 
the Naira figures must be divided by eighty. However, since the trading of the 
Naira responds to market forces, the Naira is dynamic. 
Per capita income. The amount of income per person. It is calculated by dividing the total 
income of a given country by its population.9 
Political instability. A political atmosphere (especially investment climate as it relates to 
this study) that is uncertain. Example: Government unrest, ranging from frequent 
political changes, policy intervention, internal wars, military coup to social unrest, 
like riots and the like. 
6Donald W. Moffot, Economic Dictionary (New York: Elsevier Science 
Publishing Company, 1983), 164. 
Bannock R. E. Baxter, and R. Ress, The Penguin Dictionary of Economics 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 179. 
8Ibid, 597. 
9 Christine Ammer and Dean S. Ammer, Dictionary of Business and Economics 
(New York: Free Press, 1984), 348-349. 
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Political risk. Negative perception emanating from internal instability, inter-governmental 
relationships, anticipated or unanticipated.10 
Portfolio equity investment. An aspect of foreign private investment that allows foreign 
investors to retain a share of ownership. Unlike Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
however, portfolio equity investment does not allow foreign investors to 
participate in the management of the company.11 
Public policy. Government rules and regulations representing the authoritative decisional 
output of a political system. Public policy can be considered individually or 
collectively; hence, it may be expressed in the following forms: executive orders, 
laws, court decisions, local ordinances, and administrative decisions. 
Terms of trade. The ratio of the prices of a country's exports to the prices of its imports. 
Third World. The developing countries of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and 
Asia that are mainly characterized by low levels of per capita income, general 
dependence on the economies of developed countries, high rate of population 
growth and low life expectancy.14 
Transfer of technology. Said to occur when technical and productive know-how have 
been assimilated by the host country. This would make it possible for the host 
country to adequately employ a given technology in its productive activities 
without the assistance of foreign countries. 
10Ibid„ 96. 
1 'isaiah Frank, "Finance and Third World Economic Growth," The Committee 
for Economic Development (June 1987): 11. 
'"Jack C. Plane, Robert E. Riggs, and Helenan S. Robin. The Dictionary> of 
Political Analysis (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO Information Services, 1982). 
120. 
13 David W. Pearce, The Dictionary of Modern Economics (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1983), 434. 
,4Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World (New York: 
Longman, 1985), 610. 
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